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ARTICLES
JUDGING THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT
Adam B. Cox*
Thomas J. Miles**
The Voting Rights Act has radically altered the political status of
minority voters and dramatically transformed the partisan structure of
American politics.  Given the political and racial salience of cases brought
under the Act, it is surprising that the growing literature on the effects of a
judge’s ideology and race on judicial decisionmaking has overlooked these
cases.  This Article provides the first systematic evidence that judicial ideol-
ogy and race are closely related to findings of liability in voting rights cases.
Democratic appointees are significantly more likely than Republican appoin-
tees to vote for liability under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.  These parti-
san effects become even more prominent when judges appointed by the same
President sit together on panels.  Moreover, a judge’s race appears to have an
even greater effect on the likelihood of her voting in favor of minority plain-
tiffs than does her political affiliation:  minority judges are more than twice
as likely to favor liability.  This finding contrasts starkly with prior studies of
judicial decisionmaking—studies finding that, across a range of legal ques-
tions, a judge’s race has only a weak effect, if any, on the resolution of cases.
As with partisanship, the so-called “panel effects” of race are strong, as white
judges become substantially more likely to vote in favor of liability when they
sit with minority judges.  These findings have significant implications for a
number of controversies, including debates about which institutions are best
situated to protect minority voting rights and disputes about the role of diver-
sity within the federal judiciary.
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INTRODUCTION
The Voting Rights Act has dramatically reshaped the political land-
scape of the United States.  In the four decades since its enactment, it has
helped substantially expand political opportunities for minority voters
and has contributed to the radical realignment of southern politics.1  Of
course, the Voting Rights Act’s power to transform politics raises ques-
tions about its partisan implications.  Some critics complain that it system-
atically benefits Republicans; others call the Act’s prohibition of minority
vote dilution a Democratic Party protection provision.2  Moreover, many
commentators worry that its powerful political effects create incentives
for courts and the Department of Justice to enforce the Act in a selective
and partisan fashion.3  These concerns have been heightened by the
1. See generally, e.g., David Lublin, The Republican South (2004); Quiet Revolution
in the South:  The Impact of the Voting Rights Act 1965–1990 (Chandler Davidson &
Bernard Grofman eds., 1994).
2. See, e.g., infra notes 75–76 and accompanying text. R
3. See infra notes 134–135 and accompanying text. R
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Justice Department’s recent approval under the Act of several controver-
sial redistricting plans, including the Texas mid-decade redistricting plan
orchestrated by Tom DeLay.4
To what extent does judicial ideology drive the adjudication of
Voting Rights Act cases?  Moreover, given the prominence of race in
these cases, does a judge’s race affect her likelihood of voting in favor of
Voting Rights Act liability?  This Article represents a first attempt to pro-
vide systematic answers to these questions.  In recent years the legal acad-
emy has devoted substantial energy to investigating the impact of judicial
ideology and demographics on decisionmaking in the federal courts.5
For all that attention, however, no one has focused on the role these
characteristics might play in voting rights cases where the partisan and
racial politics are, almost by definition, extremely salient.  Voting rights
cases are unique in that successful claims often have clear implications
for who will win and lose elections.  And because race and partisanship
correlate closely in the United States, the partisan and racial implications
of voting rights cases are often plain on their face.
To study the role that political ideology and race play in the adjudi-
cation of voting rights disputes, we examine every published federal case
decided under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act since 1982.  From this
large dataset we draw three central conclusions.
First, judicial ideology significantly influences judicial decisionmak-
ing in Voting Rights Act cases.  Scholars often speculate that this is so, but
no one has systematically studied the extent of this influence.  Using the
party of the appointing President as a rough proxy for ideology, we show
that Democratic appointees are significantly more likely than Republican
appointees to cast votes in favor of the plaintiff under section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act.  Moreover, these party effects become even more pro-
nounced when judges appointed by a President of the same party sit to-
gether on panels.  A Democratic appointee sitting with two other Demo-
cratic appointees is much more likely to vote in favor of liability than a
Democratic appointee sitting with two Republican appointees.
This basic finding about the role of political ideology is extremely
important for understanding modern section 2 jurisprudence.  But its sig-
nificance is not limited to this (central) provision of the Voting Rights
Act; it is also important to our evaluation of other provisions of the Act,
and to our understanding of how Article III judges approach voting
rights cases more generally.  For example, this finding has potentially im-
portant implications for the ongoing debates about the future of section
5 of the Voting Rights Act.  Section 5 of the Act—which singles out some
4. For a discussion of the mid-decade redistricting efforts in Texas and elsewhere, see
Adam B. Cox, Partisan Fairness and Redistricting Politics, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 751 (2004)
[hereinafter Cox, Partisan Fairness].
5. See, e.g., Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy?
An Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. Chi. L. Rev. 823 (2006); see also sources cited
infra notes 66, 69–70. R
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jurisdictions and requires that they pre-clear any changes to their voting
rules with the federal government—was reauthorized recently after being
set to expire in 2007.6  During the reauthorization debates some com-
mentators and members of Congress expressed concerns about the fact
that the preclearance process is run by the potentially partisan Justice
Department.7  Some prominent scholars even suggested that the scope of
section 5 should be scaled back to limit this threat.8  An implicit assump-
tion of this argument is that there is less risk that partisanship will influ-
ence the application of other Voting Rights Act tools (like section 2 litiga-
tion) that protect minority voting rights.  Our findings show, however,
that this assumption must at least be qualified, as ideology appears to play
a substantial role in the operation of these other tools as well.  We do not
mean to suggest that this means section 2 should be abandoned in order
to eliminate the ideological temptation that Republican and Democratic
judges might face when they adjudicate such claims.  For one thing, the
disaggregated institutional structure of the federal judiciary channels par-
tisanship in a different way than does the centralized bureaucratic struc-
ture of the Justice Department.9  Our analysis does reveal, however, that it
is a mistake to judge the efficacy and neutrality of section 5 against an
idealized system, rather than against the actual alternative institutional
mechanisms embodied in the Voting Rights Act.
Second, we show that a judge’s race influences her voting pattern
even more than her political affiliation.  After controlling for other
factors, an African-American judge is more than twice as likely as a non-
African-American judge to vote for section 2 liability.  While the number
of African-American judges in our dataset is relatively small, the size of
this effect is striking.  Moreover, there is substantial evidence that the
race of other panel members may influence the votes of judges in Voting
Rights Act litigation.  When a white judge sits on a panel with at least one
African-American judge, she becomes roughly 20 percentage points more
likely to find a section 2 violation.
6. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2000); Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott
King Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-
246, 120 Stat. 577.
7. See, e.g., Dan Eggen, Staff Opinions Banned in Voting Rights Cases:  Criticism of
Justice Dept.’s Rights Division Grows, Wash. Post, Dec. 10, 2005, at A3; Mark A. Posner,
The Politicization of Justice Department Decisionmaking Under Section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act:  Is It a Problem and What Should Congress Do? (Jan. 30, 2006) (unpublished
white paper, on file with the Columbia Law Review), at http://www.acslaw.org/files/Section
%205%20decisionmaking%201-30-06.pdf.
8. See, e.g., An Introduction to the Expiring Provisions of the Voting Rights Act and
Legal Issues Relating to Reauthorization:  Hearing on S. 2703 Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 109th Cong. 220–25 (2006) (statement of Professor Samuel Issacharoff, NYU
School of Law); Samuel Issacharoff, Is Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act a Victim of Its
Own Success?, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 1710, 1730–31 (2004) [hereinafter Issacharoff, Victim of
Its Own Success].
9. See infra text accompanying note 135. R
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These findings are perhaps the first to document a strong connec-
tion between a judge’s race and her judicial decisions—and certainly are
the first to do so in the area of minority voting rights litigation.  Over the
past several decades, extensive empirical research has concluded that a
judge’s race has little, if any, impact on decisionmaking in a variety of
criminal and civil rights litigation.10  In stark contrast, our analysis reveals
extremely large differences in the behavior of African-American and non-
African-American judges.  These differences have potentially important
implications for debates about the role of diversity in the federal judici-
ary.  Many commentators have suggested that minority judges provide
“descriptive” but not “substantive” representation within the judiciary—
changing the face of federal courts but not their actual operation.11  But
our data show that, at least in voting rights cases, African-American judges
appear to bring a systematically different perspective to the bench.
Third, our findings cast doubt on some conventional wisdom about
litigation under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.  Recent work on the
Act has suggested that section 2 lawsuits have been markedly more suc-
cessful in jurisdictions that have been singled out by section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act for additional federal oversight known as
“preclearance.”12  The possibility that section 5 coverage relates closely to
section 2 liability is thought by some to be important for current debates
over section 5’s constitutionality.13  Congress recently reauthorized the
special oversight provisions of section 5, an extension justified in part by
the idea that the jurisdictions covered by section 5 still have more voting
rights problems than uncovered jurisdictions.  Higher rates of section 2
liability in section 5 jurisdictions might be taken as support for the con-
clusion that covered jurisdictions do have more problems.14  But our
analysis finds that, once one controls for other influences on liability, sec-
tion 5 coverage is not a strong predictor of liability in most section 2
cases.  This does not mean, of course, that jurisdictions subject to section
5 are not unique in ways that justify additional federal oversight.  It does
mean, however, that liability rates in section 2 cases do not themselves
appear to provide evidence of that uniqueness.
Still, we can confirm one standard claim about section 2.  Commen-
tators have suggested that the success rate of section 2 cases has been
falling over time.  Our data verify this fact:  in cases that resulted in pub-
lished opinions, voting rights plaintiffs’ rates of success have fallen from
10. See sources cited infra notes 99–102. R
11. See infra note 100 and accompanying text.  In Hanna Pitkin’s classic formulation, R
descriptive representation is concerned with reflecting particular identities, while
substantive representation is concerned with acting on behalf of particular interests.  See
Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, The Concept of Representation (1967).
12. See infra note 28 and accompanying text. R
13. See, e.g., Nathaniel Persily, The Promise and Pitfalls of the New Voting Rights Act,
117 Yale L. J. 174 (2007).
14. See id. at 207 (“[T]he data concerning section 2 violations . . . provides the best
systematic evidence to distinguish covered from uncovered jurisdictions.”).
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40% in the years immediately after 1982 to 18% in the most recent five
years.  It is unclear what to make of this change.  It could reflect the suc-
cess of the Voting Rights Act over the past several decades in eradicating
the most discriminatory voting practices.  It could also reflect changing
judicial attitudes.  One might speculate, for example, that attitudes have
changed about the relative importance of descriptive and substantive mi-
nority representation or about the effectiveness of section 2 litigation at
advancing these different representational goals.  Or perhaps judicial atti-
tudes toward civil rights plaintiffs more generally have changed.  Our
data cannot distinguish among these or other possibilities.  Still, the de-
cline in success rates highlights the importance of investigating these pos-
sibilities in order to better understand how the Voting Rights Act func-
tions as it enters its fifth decade of operation.
The Article proceeds in three Parts.  Part I provides a snapshot of
section 2 cases over the past two decades.  This Part introduces several
prominent features of the cases that fit into a conventional account about
what might influence liability under section 2.  Part II turns to a different
set of potential influences—to the role that judicial race and partisanship
might play in liability determinations under the Act.  The data provide
substantial support for our hypotheses, but call into question some of the
conventional wisdom about section 2 litigation that we introduced in Part
I.  Part III discusses some of the potential implications of our findings.
I. THE CONVENTIONAL ACCOUNT
In this Article, we examine the role that a judge’s race and partisan-
ship play in the adjudication of claims brought under section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act (VRA).  To do so, however, it is helpful first to under-
stand the structure of the statute and the basic patterns of section 2 litiga-
tion.  Accordingly, this Part provides background about section 2 and ex-
plains the universe of cases that we analyze.  It then introduces three
features of section 2 cases that are often prominent in accounts about
what influences the success or failure of those cases.
A. Statutory History and the Universe of Section 2 Cases
Section 2 is the central private enforcement provision of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965.  As initially enacted, the language of the section
tracked fairly closely that of the Fifteenth Amendment:  it prohibited
states and political subdivisions from applying a voting rule “to deny or
abridge the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of
race or color.”15  Perhaps because it mirrored so closely the language of
the Fifteenth Amendment, the provision was little used in the years im-
15. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 2, 79 Stat. 437, 437; see also U.S.
Const. amend. XV, § 1 (“The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be
denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or
previous condition of servitude.”).
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mediately following its enactment.  The Fifteenth Amendment itself (as
well as the Fourteenth Amendment) was more often the source of legal
claims brought by minority voters.16  Nonetheless, the two provisions’ tex-
tual similarity became extremely important in 1980, when the Supreme
Court decided Mobile v. Bolden.17 The Court held in that case that the
Fifteenth Amendment proscribed only intentional racial discrimination in
voting.18  This holding, combined with the Court’s affirmation that sec-
tion 2 only restated the Fifteenth Amendment’s protections,19 meant that
plaintiffs would have to prove that a voting practice was enacted or main-
tained for an invidious purpose in order to obtain relief under section
2.20 Bolden’s effect was said to be “devastating . . . existing cases were
overturned and dismissed,” and a good deal of voting rights litigation
ground to a halt.21
In response to mounting criticism of Bolden, Congress in 1982
amended section 2 to eliminate the requirement that plaintiffs show pur-
poseful discrimination.22  Amended section 2 now requires plaintiffs to
show that, “based on the totality of circumstances, . . . the political
processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political sub-
division are not equally open to participation” by minority voters—a con-
dition satisfied when those voters “have less opportunity than other [vot-
ers] to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of
their choice.”23  While there has been considerable disagreement about
16. See, e.g., White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S.
124 (1971); cf. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 344–45 (1960) (relying, prior to
passage of Voting Rights Act, on Fifteenth Amendment to strike down statute redrawing
boundaries of Tuskeegee, Alabama).
17. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
18. See id. at 61–63.
19. Id. at 61 (“In view of [section 2’s] language and its sparse but clear legislative
history, it is evident that this statutory provision adds nothing to the appellees’ Fifteenth
Amendment claim.”).
20. See id.
21. Armand Derfner, Vote Dilution and the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982,
in Minority Vote Dilution 149 (Chandler Davidson ed., 1989); see also Samuel Issacharoff,
Pamela Karlan & Richard Pildes, The Law of Democracy 710–11, 746 (2d rev. ed. 2002)
(discussing outcry following Bolden and “substantial obstacle [it threw] in the path of
minority plaintiffs”).
22. See Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 3, 96 Stat. 131,
134 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (2000)).  Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, which we
discuss below, was a temporary provision of the Act set to expire in 1982.  See Derfner,
supra note 21, at 150–51; infra notes 46–50.  The section 5 reauthorization process, R
coming closely on the heels of the Court’s decision in Mobile v. Bolden, provided Congress
an opportunity to respond to—and in large part overturn—the Court’s decision in Bolden.
See Derfner, supra note 21, at 151–52.  For a discussion of the history surrounding the R
reauthorization debate and the amendment of section 2, see, for example, Abigail M.
Thernstrom, Whose Votes Count?  Affirmative Action and Minority Voting Rights (1987);
Thomas M. Boyd & Stephen J. Markman, The 1982 Amendments to the Voting Rights Act:
A Legislative History, 40 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1347 (1983).
23. Section 2 states in full that:
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the precise meaning of this standard,24 the amendments paved the way
for section 2 to become the principal litigation tool in modern vote dilu-
tion litigation.25
Because section 2 became crucial to voting rights litigation only after
its amendment in 1982, we focus on section 2 claims adjudicated after
this time.  Between 1982 and 2004, federal courts issued more than 750
decisions in cases raising section 2 claims.26  Information on these deci-
sions was initially collected by the Voting Rights Initiative at the
University of Michigan Law School, under the direction of Ellen Katz.27
Katz and her coauthors assembled a rich set of data about these Voting
Rights Act decisions; using these data, they documented and analyzed the
findings concerning race discrimination in voting that courts have made
in section 2 cases over the last two decades.28
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or
procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a
manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the
United States to vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of the
guarantees set forth in section 1973b(f)(2) of this title, as provided in subsection
(b) of this section.
(b) A violation of subsection (a) of this section is established if, based on the
totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to
nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open
to participation by members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) of
this section in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the
electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of
their choice.  The extent to which members of a protected class have been
elected to office in the State or political subdivision is one circumstance which
may be considered: Provided, That nothing in this section establishes a right to
have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion
in the population.
42 U.S.C. § 1973.
24. The deep disagreements are illustrated by the Court’s fractured dispositions of
both Gingles itself and more recent section 2 cases.  See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30
(1986); see also League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594, (2006); cf.
Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461 (2003) (reflecting deep disagreement over the proper
interpretation of section 5’s nonretrogression requirement, and tying this disagreement in
part to divide over the proper meaning of section 2).
25. See, e.g., Issacharoff, Karlan & Pildes, supra note 21, at 747 (“The 1982 R
amendments marked a significant shift in the nature of litigation under the Voting Rights
Act.  [Before] 1982 . . . [s]ection 2 was virtually never used . . . . Since 1982, the bulk of
racial vote dilution litigation has taken place under section 2, rather than under either
section 5 or the Constitution.”).
26. The Voting Rights Initiative at the University of Michigan Law School collected
federal court decisions that came down on or after June 29, 1982—the date on which the
amendments to section 2 were signed into law—and before October 2004.  See generally
The Voting Rights Initiative, Documenting Discrimination:  Judicial Findings Under
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act Since 1982, at http://sitemaker.umich.edu/voting
rights/home (last visited Nov. 10, 2007) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
27. Id.
28. See generally Ellen Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination in Voting:  Judicial
Findings Under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act Since 1982 (Final Report of the Voting
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To assemble the dataset, we began with Katz’s impressive database of
voting rights cases.29  Because we are interested in a different set of ques-
tions than Katz and her coauthors, we analyzed a subset of decisions
within that database.30  Our focus is on the relationship between the
judges’ characteristics and findings of liability under the Act.  For that
reason, we examined only those dispositions in the Voting Rights
Initiative database in which a court decided a question of section 2 liabil-
ity.31  Moreover, because we are interested in how trial courts and appel-
late panels decide these cases, we excluded en banc circuit court and
Supreme Court opinions.  The resulting sample contained 341 disposi-
tions—133 that were issued by federal circuit courts and 208 that were
issued by trial judges or three-judge trial panels.  Trial panels are part of
the section 2 landscape because the federal jurisdictional statute requires
that a special three-judge district court be convened whenever a plaintiff
challenges the constitutionality of a state legislative or congressional re-
districting plan.32  Because plaintiffs sometimes combine constitutional
claims against such redistricting plans with Voting Rights Act claims,
some of the dispositions in our data were issued by three-judge district
courts.  Decisions by district court judges sitting alone comprise most of
Rights Initiative, University of Michigan Law School), 39 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 643,
643–772 (2006), available at http://sitemaker.umich.edu/votingrights/files/finalreport.
pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Katz et al., Documenting
Discrimination]; Ellen D. Katz, Not Like the South?  Regional Variation and Political
Participation Through the Lens of Section 2, in Voting Rights Act Reauthorization of 2006:
Perspectives on Democracy, Participation and Power 183, 183–221 (A. Henderson ed.,
2007) [hereinafter Katz, Not Like the South].
29. See Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination, supra note 28. R
30. Because of her research objectives, Katz focused on opinions that represented the
“final disposition” of a particular section 2 lawsuit.  Out of the 763 opinions in the Voting
Rights Initiative’s dataset, Katz identified 331 unique lawsuits.  For the purposes of her
analysis, she used the last judicial decision issued in each of these lawsuits.  See Katz, Not
Like the South, supra note 28, at 186–87 nn. 3–4.  These decisions were coded in the R
Voting Rights Initiative dataset as “Final Word.”  Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination,
supra note 28.  Given our different focus, we did not limit our dataset to “Final Word” R
dispositions.  Thus, in some instances, our dataset contains multiple decisions from the
same lawsuit.
31. To determine whether an opinion concerned liability, we utilized Katz’s coding of
“Case Type.”  Katz coded the cases as being of type “Preliminary,” “Settlement,” “Liability,”
“Remedy,” “Fees,” and “Other.”  We used all cases of type “Liability.”  Accordingly, the data
we use in our analysis are both more and less inclusive than the data analyzed by Professor
Katz.  They are more inclusive in that the data we analyze encompass decisions on section 2
liability that are not the final judicial decision rendered in the litigation.  In lawsuits in
which a district court decision was appealed, our data include both district court and
appellate court decisions.  In contrast, Professor Katz’s data in such instances included only
the appellate court decision.  The data are also less inclusive than Professor Katz’s in that
they exclude decisions on issues other than section 2 liability.  Professor Katz’s data
included decisions on issues such as attorneys’ fees that are ancillary to our primary
question of how judges resolve questions of section 2 liability.
32. See 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (2000) (“A district court of three judges shall be convened
. . . when an action is filed challenging the constitutionality of the apportionment of
congressional districts or the apportionment of any statewide legislative body.”).
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the trial court opinions.  But 11% of the data—36 decisions—represent
rulings made by the three-judge trial panels.  For all of the decisions in
the data, we utilized Katz’s coding of whether the court found section 2
liability.
For these dispositions, we analyze every vote cast for or against liabil-
ity.  To analyze judge-votes rather than dispositions, we supplemented the
dataset with information on the names of the judges who participated in
each disposition and, for panel decisions, information on whether each
judge had joined the majority, concurred, or dissented.33  There were a
total of 679 judge-votes cast in the 341 decisions.  These votes were cast by
349 different judges, for whom the median number of decisions was 1.0
and the mean 2.1.  We collected demographic and biographical informa-
tion about each judge in the dataset from the Federal Judicial Center.34
These data permit us to examine judicial decisionmaking at the level of
judge-votes.
B. Prominent Features of Section 2 Cases
Many aspects of section 2 cases—aspects having nothing to do with
the judges’ identities or biographies—might influence the likelihood of
liability.  While we focus centrally on the judges’ identities, it is important
to understand other potential correlates of liability.  In this section we
focus on three potential sources of variation that are prominent in ac-
counts about how section 2 has operated in practice:  (1) the types of
practices challenged in section 2 litigation, (2) the location of section 2
litigation, and (3) the timing of section 2 litigation.35
1. Types and Origins of Voting Practices. — Section 2 proscribes any
voting practice “which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of
any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color.”36
33. Because Katz’s dataset did not include complete information on judge-votes, we
re-collected information on the names and votes of judges participating in each
disposition.  Judges who dissented were recorded as voting in the opposite direction from
the court’s conclusion with respect to section 2 liability, and the court’s conclusion itself
was drawn from the coding in the Voting Rights Initiative dataset.
34. The Federal Judicial Center (FJC) compiles biographical information about all
federal judges from publicly available sources.  The FJC notes that its information about
the race or ethnicity of each judge is “determined, whenever possible, by [a] judge’s [own]
self-definition.”  Federal Judicial Center, History of the Federal Judiciary, About the
Biographical Directory of Federal Judges:  Description, at http://www.fjc.gov/history/
home.nsf (last visited Nov. 11, 2007) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
35. In Appendix I we provide summary statistics about a variety of aspects of section 2
litigation.  These statistics are themselves very interesting, as they provide perhaps the most
complete portrait currently available of section 2 litigation patterns.
36. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (2000).  As noted above, this is the current text of section 2.
Prior to 1982, the provision prohibited states from using any voting practice “to deny or
abridge” minority voting rights, rather than prohibiting states from using any voting
practice “in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of” minority voting rights.
Compare Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 2, 79 Stat. 437, with 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973(a) (emphasis added).  Congress made this change from the active to the passive
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Courts have interpreted this language to cover a variety of voting prac-
tices.  Most obviously, section 2 covers classic vote denial claims—that is, a
claim that a practice unlawfully prevents minority voters from casting bal-
lots.  Examples of such practices could include literacy requirements,37
felon disenfranchisement rules,38 voter identification requirements,39
and so forth.  Over time, however, courts also interpreted section 2 to
apply to claims of vote dilution—that is, a claim that a practice unlawfully
dilutes the political opportunities of a protected class of voters, despite
the fact that those voters are able to cast ballots.40  A variety of election
practices can be subject to a claim of vote dilution:  at-large electoral
structures,41 single-member districting schemes,42 etc.  Moreover, these
practices can be produced at either the local or state level.
It is commonly thought that suits challenging certain types of elec-
tion practices are more likely to be successful than suits challenging other
types of practices.  The summary statistics shown in Appendix I suggest
some such patterns.  The data are dominated by decisions involving chal-
lenges to at-large elections (which comprise over half of the decisions)
and challenges to reapportionment plans (which represent just over a
third of the decisions).  These decisions resulted in liability about one-
voice to emphasize that it was rejecting the requirement that plaintiffs show intentional
discrimination to make out a section 2 claim.
37. In fact, Congress when it enacted the Voting Rights Act was so concerned about
the discriminatory consequences of literacy requirements that it banned their use in six
southern states.  See section 4 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 4, 79
Stat. 437, 438–39 (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973b–1973c).  Later amendments
extended this ban to the rest of the nation and made it permanent.  See Voting Rights Act
Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, sec. 6, § 201, 84 Stat. 314, 315 (current version at
42 U.S.C. § 1973aa) (extending temporary ban to entire nation); Voting Rights Act
Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-73, § 201, 89 Stat. 400, 400–01 (current version at 42
U.S.C. §§ 1973b–1973c) (making the temporary nationwide ban permanent).
38. See, e.g., Hayden v. Pataki, 449 F.3d 305 (2d Cir. 2006) (en banc); Johnson v.
Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 2005) (en banc); Farrakhan v. Washington, 338
F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2003).
39. See, e.g., Daniel P. Tokaji, The New Vote Denial:  Where Election Reform Meets
the Voting Rights Act, 57 S.C. L. Rev. 689, 712–13 (2006) (discussing case law applying
section 2 to voter identification requirements).
40. See, e.g., Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 46–48 (1986) (discussing cases).
One standard claim about section 2 vote dilution litigation is that its early focus was on at-
large (and similar) electoral structures that were implemented principally by local
governments.  These were the types of practices that Congress may have been most
interested in when it amended the Voting Rights Act in 1982 to rehabilitate vote dilution
litigation.  See id. at 35 (explaining that the 1982 amendments were largely a response to
the Court’s opinion in Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980), a case concerning a vote
dilution challenge to an at-large election structure); see also supra note 21.  Over time, this R
story of section 2 goes, the focus turned to the structure of individual districts within single-
member-district arrangements, such as state legislative or congressional districting
arrangements adopted by state legislatures.  See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, Understanding
the Right to an Undiluted Vote, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 1663, 1674–76 (2001).
41. See, e.g., Gingles, 478 U.S. at 46.
42. See, e.g., Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1001–02 (1994).
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third of the time—34% of the time for challenges to at-large districts, and
30% of the time for reapportionment challenges.  In contrast, the re-
maining catch-all category of challenges, which includes challenges to
policies ranging from majority vote requirements to felon disenfranchise-
ment laws, resulted in an appreciably lower success rate of 22%.
Challenges to local government practices were also more prevalent
and more likely to succeed.  Over 70% of the decisions involved chal-
lenges to local government practices; almost all of the remaining deci-
sions challenged state practices.43  The focus on local governments
should be unsurprising, as the most common type of practice chal-
lenged—at-large elections—was most often produced by local govern-
ments.44  As with the type of election practice, the rate at which courts
assigned liability varied modestly according to which level of government
was challenged.  Courts were about 10% more likely to hold local prac-
tices, rather than state practices, in violation of section 2.45
2. Geography and Preclearance. — Conventional accounts of the
Voting Rights Act have long emphasized the way in which the Act has
applied with different force to different parts of the nation.  As enacted
in 1965, the VRA included two principal enforcement mechanisms.  The
first was section 2.  The second, considered far more important at the
time, was section 5 of the Act, which prohibited all “covered” jurisdictions
from making any changes to their voting practices or requirements with-
out first seeking preclearance from the federal government.46  The
formula for determining which jurisdictions were covered was facially
neutral, but it was carefully crafted to encompass the deep southern states
with a long history of disenfranchising African-American voters.47  Be-
cause the preclearance provisions singled out some jurisdictions for more
43. Only four cases—less than 2%—involved challenges to federal election practices
but not to either state or local practices.  (A few cases involved challenges to multiple types
of practices.)
44. In our data, 86% of decisions involving at-large elections challenged local
governmental bodies.  Even among reapportionment decisions, challenges to local
practices constituted 59% of the dispositions.
45. Challenges to local government practices resulted in liability about 32% of the
time, while challenges to state practices resulted in liability about 23% of the time.  Cf.
Appendix I (presenting a slightly different comparison—between challenges to local
practices and challenges to non-local practices).
46. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2000).  For a discussion of the perceived importance of
section 5’s enforcement structure, see South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966)
(upholding constitutionality of section 5); The Future of the Voting Rights Act, at xi–xiii
(David L. Epstein et al. eds., 2006).
47. See § 1973b(b).  As initially enacted, section 5’s coverage formula extended
coverage over some states in their entirety, as well as over a number of local governments
that were not within covered states.  During the 1975 reauthorization of section 5, the
coverage formula was amended and expanded a bit.  Today, “[s]ection 5 applies to eight
states in their entirety (Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South
Carolina, and Texas), to substantial portions of three states (New York, North Carolina,
and Virginia), and to small portions of five other states . . . .”  Posner, supra note 7, at 3. R
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intrusive federal oversight of election practices,48 these provisions were
enacted as temporary measures.49  But they have been reauthorized (with
minor amendments) four times since 1965—most recently in August of
2006, when they were extended for another 25 years.50
In light of the role that southern exceptionalism has played in the
history of minority disenfranchisement and in the structure of the Voting
Rights Act, one might expect different patterns of section 2 litigation in
southern and non-southern states or in covered and uncovered jurisdic-
tions.  The raw data appear to support this hypothesis.  The summary sta-
tistics in Appendix I show that almost two-thirds of the cases occur in
southern states.51  In addition, courts were ten percentage points more
likely to conclude that election practices inside rather than outside the
South violated section 2.52  The pattern is similar for election practices in
jurisdictions covered by the preclearance procedures of section 5.53
Courts were more likely to conclude that election practices covered by
section 5 were discriminatory.  These election practices were found to vio-
late section 2 about 40% of the time, while liability was found only 27% of
the time for practices not subject to preclearance.54
3. Liability Trends. — The timing of section 2 litigation might also be
closely related to the success of those suits.  As we noted above, decisions
in our dataset assigned section 2 liability about 30% of the time.  But the
pattern of litigation changed over time.  The number of cases decided in
each year has fluctuated fairly widely, with large spikes in the number of
section 2 lawsuits occurring after each decennial round of redistricting.55
Still, over time a clear trend emerges.  In the first ten years following the
1982 Amendments to the VRA, the number of judicial decisions issued
48. See § 1973b(b).
49. See Issacharoff, Karlan & Pildes, supra note 21, at 714 (noting that section 5 was R
initially scheduled to expire in 1970).
50. See Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act
Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, § 5, 120 Stat. 577,
580–81.
51. The Voting Rights Initiative coded the following states as “Southern”:  Alabama,
Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia.
52. Cases occurring in the South resulted in liability 34.1% of the time; those
occurring outside the South resulted in liability 23.4% of the time.
53. Despite the overlap in section 5 coverage and the former confederate states, Katz’s
coding of the cases indicates that decisions arising from covered jurisdictions are far less
frequent than decisions on southern election practices.  About 28% of the decisions in the
data involve practices governed by section 5, while nearly two-thirds occur in the South.
54. These figures are consistent with Ellen Katz’s finding that the final court to rule in
a section 2 challenge was more likely to assign liability when the challenge contested an
election practice in a preclearance jurisdiction.  See Katz et al., Documenting
Discrimination, supra note 28, at 655. R
55. In accordance with Reynolds v. Sims and its progeny, states and local governments
are required to redraw their district lines following the release of each census.  See
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 583 (1964); Cox, Partisan Fairness, supra note 4, at 757–58 R
(discussing development of decennial redistricting requirement).
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annually on section 2 liability trended upward.  It peaked in 1992, a year
that featured 30 decisions.  But since 1992, the trend reversed.  In 2004,
courts issued only 18 decisions in section 2 liability cases, a figure nearly
half of the peak.  Moreover, from 1999 to 2001, courts handed down be-
tween four and seven decisions each year, below even the level of the
years 1982 and 1983.
As the number of section 2 liability cases has fallen over time, the
rate of plaintiff success has also declined.  While the rate at which courts
found section 2 liability fluctuated widely on a year-to-year basis, trends
are easy to see when one examines the data over intervals of several years.
For example, the rate at which courts found section 2 liability exceeded
40% during 1982–1989, the first seven years after the amendments to the
VRA, but it fell to 26% during the 1990s.  In the last five years of the data,
it slipped to 18%.  Figure 2 highlights this declining liability rate, as well
as the changes in the number of decisions over time.
FIGURE 1. LITIGATION TIME TRENDS
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C. The Status of the Conventional Account
The brief snapshot of the data that we provide above might suggest
that the history of litigation under section 2 tracks something like the
following account:  discrimination at the local level is a bigger problem
than at the state level; at-large schemes are more prone to produce vote
dilution than other schemes; discrimination is worse in the South and in
areas covered by section 5 than it is in other areas; and the presence of
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obviously discriminatory practices has declined over time.  In fact, this is a
relatively conventional account in the literature.56
Unfortunately, these data cannot alone support this conventional
wisdom.  Consider the decline over time in the rate at which courts find
section 2 liability.  The conventional explanation for this decline is that
the nature of the claims brought under section 2 changed over time.
Early lawsuits under section 2 challenged the most blatant discriminatory
practices, and courts were more ready to conclude that these electoral
practices violated section 2.57  Over time, however, election officials re-
moved the most egregious discriminatory election practices, either in di-
rect response to section 2 litigation or in the shadow of emerging prece-
dents.  The remaining election practices were either less discriminatory
or presented more subtle forms of discrimination that courts were less
willing to hold in violation of section 2.58
If the decline in liability over time tracked changes in the nature of
the election practices being challenged in section 2 litigation, we might
expect these declines to line up with changes in the characteristics of
section 2 cases discussed above.  But movements over time in these ob-
served characteristics do not correlate strongly with the decline in liability
findings.  In general, the decline in the liability rate occurred well before
the greatest changes in the observable characteristics of the lawsuits that
resulted in liability decisions.  For example, the fraction of decisions in-
volving challenges to at-large election districts remained in excess of 50%
until 2000, after which it fell below 20%.  Similarly, changes in the type of
governing body challenged occurred well after the downward movement
in liability rates.  Challenges to local government bodies, such as city or
county governments, represented well over 70% of the decisions from
1982 to 1999.  Only in the last five years of the data did the frequency of
local government challenges drop to 43%.  Thus, the fall in the frequency
of at-large challenges and challenges to local governmental bodies oc-
curred nearly a full decade after the drop in liability rates.59
The absence of a strong correspondence in the movements of liabil-
ity rates and case characteristics over time does not exclude the possibility
that a change in some unmeasured aspect of these cases is responsible for
56. See, e.g., Issacharoff, Karlan & Pildes, supra note 21, at 657–58. R
57. See id. at 813 (noting that “[m]uch of the ‘easy’ litigation” had occurred by 1990
census).
58. See id.
59. Other lawsuit characteristics featured movements over time that differed from
those of at-large challenges but that still did not closely track those of the liability rates.
The fraction of decisions that challenged election practices in jurisdictions covered by
section 5 of the VRA declined steadily for the first ten years following the 1982
Amendments and stabilized in the mid-1990s.  Between 1982 and 1986, roughly 45% of the
decisions arose from election practices in jurisdictions covered by the preclearance
procedures of section 5.  By the early 1990s, this fraction dropped to 19%, but in the late
1990s and the early 2000s, election practices in these jurisdictions accounted for 27% of
the section 2 liability decisions.
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the decline in liability.  Indeed, the particular characteristics recorded in
the data—such as whether the challenge is to an at-large election,
whether the challenge is to a local governmental body, and whether the
jurisdiction is covered by section 5—are relatively crude.  Other impor-
tant aspects of the cases, such as the strength of the evidence and the
talent of the attorneys, are unobserved in our data.  Still, these data are
the most comprehensive to date on section 2 litigation, and they make
clear that changes in the measured characteristics of the cases do not
explain the decline in liability rates.
The data also cannot support the conventional account for a more
foundational reason.  When plaintiffs have a higher success rate in partic-
ular jurisdictions, or during specific years, or against certain types of prac-
tices, there are two possible explanations for the difference.  First, the
difference may reflect actual changes in the discriminatory nature of elec-
tion practices across time, place, and type of practice.  But there is a sec-
ond possibility:  the different rates of success may also reflect changes
across times and places in the behavior of plaintiffs, defendants, and
courts.  That is, election practices may have remained constant, while en-
forcement activity, settlement decisions, and judicial attitudes toward par-
ticular election practices may have changed.  Raw plaintiff success rates
cannot distinguish between these possibilities.
To see this point more clearly, consider the possibility of strategic
behavior by plaintiffs and defendants.  Parties often settle disputes rather
than litigating them to conclusion.  The fact that only a certain selection
of disputes is actually litigated to conclusion may affect the success rate of
litigation.  In fact, the famed Priest-Klein hypothesis predicts that, under
certain conditions, plaintiffs’ success in litigation should approach 50%.60
A large literature has challenged the Priest-Klein hypothesis on both the-
oretical and empirical grounds.61  Whatever the status of this debate, liti-
gation under section 2 is unlikely to satisfy the preconditions of the
60. See generally George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for
Litigation, 13 J. Legal Stud. 1 (1984).  Priest and Klein hypothesize that trials occur only
when litigants are so optimistic about their chances for success that the difference between
their estimates of the plaintiff’s expected judgment exceeds the difference between trial
costs and settlement costs.  See id. at 15.  Their model predicts that when the stakes of trial
are symmetric, the fraction of cases proceeding to trial approaches zero and the plaintiff
win-rate approaches 50%.  See id. at 17.
61. The literature is vast.  For an underinclusive list of leading papers, see generally
Theodore Eisenberg, Testing the Selection Effect:  A New Theoretical Framework with
Empirical Tests, 19 J. Legal Stud. 337 (1990) (testing and rejecting 50% prediction in
sample of tort and general civil litigation); Daniel Kessler et al., Explaining Deviations
from the Fifty-Percent Rule:  A Multimodal Approach to the Selection of Cases for
Litigation, 25 J. Legal Stud. 233 (1996) (showing that empirical rejection of 50%
prediction may be due to failure of cases to conform to assumptions of prediction); Steven
Shavell, Any Frequency of Plaintiff Victory at Trial Is Possible, 25 J. Legal. Stud. 493,
499–501 (1996) (presenting model in which any fraction of cases may proceed to trial and
any plaintiff win-rate may result); Joel Waldfogel, The Selection Hypothesis and the
Relationship Between Trial and Plaintiff Victory, 103 J. Pol. Econ. 229 (1995) (testing
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Priest-Klein hypothesis.  The remedy in these cases is typically injunctive
relief rather than damages, which can make settlement more difficult.62
Moreover, the litigants are not typically private individuals or entities.
Rather, a section 2 defendant is a government entity, and the plaintiffs
are often funded by civil rights organizations.  These groups may bring
cases in which they realize they are unlikely to prevail because the litiga-
tion process itself may provide benefits.  For example, litigation can pro-
vide publicity, promote public education, and force governments to dis-
close information they would not otherwise release, all of which may
serve the organizations’ larger goals.  Against this institutional back-
ground, it is not surprising that the plaintiff win-rate in section 2 cases is
well below 50%.
Nonetheless, the reality of strategic behavior by parties makes clear
that raw plaintiff success rates alone cannot be used to assess the egre-
giousness of discriminatory practices.  For example, while it might be
tempting to conclude from the higher liability rate in southern jurisdic-
tions that discrimination is worse in these areas,63 the greater liability rate
could also be the product of different behavior in southern jurisdictions
by civil rights plaintiffs, defendants, or judges.  Perhaps discriminatory
election practices are concentrated in the South because of the region’s
history of institutionalized racism, both in and out of the political arena.
Or perhaps this history has led civil rights activists to focus their efforts in
the South and prompted judges to look sympathetically at challenges
originating in that region.  The data do not permit us to distinguish be-
tween these hypotheses.  Accordingly, it would be premature to conclude
from the data that discriminatory practices are waxing or waning—or that
the need for section 2 litigation or section 5 preclearance has become
more or less urgent.
We note these difficulties, which economists call an “identification
problem,” but we offer no solution to them, and the absence of a solution
is not a shortcoming of our research.  Our primary interest is not in mea-
suring the efficacy of section 5 preclearance or section 2 liability.  Rather,
the question we examine is whether judicial race and ideology influence
judges’ votes on section 2 liability.  There remains, of course, a possibility
that our estimates of the impact of judicial ideology or race are biased by
the omission of other relevant variables that correlate with the race or
ideology of judges hearing particular cases.  But that possibility is less
likely with these data.  The random assignment of judges to cases helps
overcome many of the selection problems identified above.  Within judi-
cial districts, trial judges are randomly assigned to cases, and within cir-
cuits, appellate judges are randomly assigned to panels.  Judicial charac-
structural model of litigation and showing that plaintiff win rates vary by area of law and do
not converge on 50%).
62. It can be more difficult for parties to settle a case involving injunctive relief
because there are frequently fewer possible outcomes over which the parties can bargain.
63. See supra note 52 and accompanying text; infra Appendix I. R
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teristics are therefore less likely to correlate with any unobserved
determinants of liability within judicial districts and circuits.  The assign-
ment of judges is, of course, not random across circuits or districts.  And
the assignment is not random across time, because the composition of
the federal judiciary changes as new judges are confirmed and sitting
judges resign.  But we can use regression analysis to control for average
differences in judges’ voting rates across time and across districts.  (These
controls are conventionally referred to as “fixed effects.”)  Moreover, we
can use this regression analysis to reduce further the risk of omitted varia-
ble bias by including in the regressions controls for the various character-
istics of the cases that are coded in the data.  For these reasons, our ap-
proach is not subject to many of the standard selection bias criticisms that
are often leveled at empirical studies of litigated cases.
II. PARTISANSHIP, RACE, AND VOTING RIGHTS ACT LITIGATION
This Part tests our core hypotheses:  that a judge’s political affiliation
and race influence her votes in section 2 cases, as well as the votes of her
colleagues.  Parts II.A and II.B provide summary statistics that strongly
support these hypotheses.  Parts II.C. and II.D then test the robustness of
these results using multivariate regression analysis to control for other
aspects of the cases, including the features emphasized in Part I—the tim-
ing, location, and type of each challenge.  This analysis generates two sets
of conclusions.  First, it confirms that the powerful effects of race and
partisanship remain even after controlling for numerous features of the
cases.  Second, the regression results prompt us to revisit Part I’s conven-
tional account of section 2 liability.  Specifically, the results cast doubt on
the conventional claim that the location of the challenged practice and
the type of practice challenged are important determinants of liability.
Part II.E provides a nontechnical summary of our findings for readers
who would prefer to skip the more detailed analysis in Parts II.C. and
II.D.
A. The Role of Political Affiliation
Surprisingly, the influence of judicial ideology in cases litigated
under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act has not previously been ex-
amined.  This is not for lack of work investigating judicial ideology more
generally.  In a variety of other doctrinal areas, scholars in recent years
have investigated the influence of judicial ideology.  These studies have
generally found that judicial ideology correlates strongly with judicial vot-
ing patterns in a wide range of policy areas, including criminal law, ad-
ministrative law, and so on.64  But VRA cases have gone unstudied.
The paucity of research on the judicial politics of Voting Rights Act
cases is surprising.  After all, for several reasons these cases are highly
politically salient.  First, VRA cases necessarily concern the legality of elec-
64. See infra notes 66–70. R
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tion practices, which means that a court’s decision to uphold or invalidate
a challenged practice can directly affect the outcome of subsequent elec-
tions.  Second, the partisan consequences of a court finding liability may
often be obvious on the face of a lawsuit.  VRA plaintiffs are overwhelm-
ingly racial minorities, and historically these minority groups have voted
disproportionately for Democratic candidates.  In many VRA cases, there-
fore, it may be clear that success for minority plaintiffs will translate into
success for the Democratic Party.65  Such clear partisan stakes may tempt
judges to favor their own political party.  Third, the outcomes of VRA
cases can affect the balance of power in government and thus influence
an entire set of public policies.  In contrast, cases that have been the sub-
ject of prior studies of judicial ideology have generally pertained to a sin-
gle issue, such as gender discrimination in employment or the actions of
an administrative agency.66
In fact, the reasons that make voting rights cases so politically salient
have often led scholars to assume that Article III judges deciding such
cases are influenced by their political ideology.67  But these hunches have
not been tested empirically.  We explore two ways in which a judge’s ide-
ology might influence the decisionmaking process in section 2 litigation:
by influencing the judge himself and by influencing the other panel
members with whom the judge sits.
1. Individual Effects. — To test the role of judicial politics, we must
first pick a measure of judicial partisanship or ideology.  Two large litera-
tures studying judicial politics—one by political scientists68 and one by
65. Of course, we do not mean to suggest that the partisan cast of VRA claims is always
clear.  During the early years of VRA enforcement, it was generally assumed that victories
for minority plaintiffs benefited the Democratic Party.  In more recent section 2 litigation
concerning majority-minority single-member districts, however, the partisan consequences
were deeply contested.  We discuss this point more fully below.  See infra text
accompanying notes 75–76. R
66. See, e.g., Miles & Sunstein, supra note 5; Richard L. Revesz, Environmental R
Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 Va. L. Rev. 1717 (1997); sources cited infra
notes 86, 92 (studying employment discrimination cases). R
67. See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, The Rights To Vote:  Some Pessimism About
Formalism, 71 Tex. L. Rev. 1705, 1737 (1993).  We note that a few scholars have studied
the role of judicial ideology in a different set of voting rights cases—the one-person, one-
vote reapportionment cases decided in the 1960s.  See Gary W. Cox & Jonathan N. Katz,
Elbridge Gerry’s Salamander:  The Electoral Consequences of the Reapportionment
Revolution (2002); Randall D. Lloyd, Separating Partisanship from Party in Judicial
Research:  Reapportionment in the U.S. District Courts, 89 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 413 (1995).
68. In the political science literature, the seminal work is by Jeffrey A. Segal and
Harold J. Spaeth.  Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the
Attitudinal Model (1993); see also Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, The Supreme Court
and the Attitudinal Model Revisited (2002).  They posited two competing conceptions of
judicial decisionmaking:  the legal model and the attitudinal model.  In the legal model,
judges make decisions based on the facts of the case and consistent with the directions of
precedent, statutes, and other sources of law.  In contrast, the attitudinal model perceives
the commands of law as frequently indeterminate and legal questions as often requiring
judges to render policy judgments.  The attitudinal model predicts that judges decide cases
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legal academics69—have long debated the appropriate measure.  Legal
scholars typically code judicial ideology as a binary variable:  using the
political party of the appointing President, they categorize each judge as
either a Democratic or Republican appointee.70  In contrast, political
scientists favor continuous measures of ideology; to array judges along an
ideological spectrum, these scholars often rely on media perceptions of
the judge at the time of appointment, or on linear combinations of vari-
ous ideological proxies of the appointing President and particular
Senators.71  The appropriate measure of judicial ideology is the subject of
a lively debate that we make no attempt to resolve here.72  For our pur-
according to their ideological preferences.  Following Segal and Spaeth, an explosion of
political science research has examined judicial decisionmaking using increasingly
sophisticated statistical methods and richer datasets.  A recent movement in political
science known as the “new institutionalism” attempts to integrate legal doctrines and
institutions into the political science analyses of judicial decisionmaking.  A sampling of
authors involved in this movement includes Lee Epstein, Thomas G. Walker & William J.
Dixon, The Supreme Court and Criminal Justice Disputes:  A Neo-Institutional Perspective,
33 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 825 (1989); Mark J. Richards & Herbert M. Krizter, Jurisprudential
Regimes in Supreme Court Decision Making, 96 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 305 (2002).
69. The literature by legal scholars, while older than the literature in political science,
has only recently turned to frequent use of statistical analysis.  Legal realists of the 1930s,
such as Karl Llewellyn and Jerome Frank, argued that statutory law did not determine the
outcome of legal disputes and called for interdisciplinary investigations of legal
decisionmaking.  See Jerome Frank, Law and the Modern Mind (1949); Karl Llewellyn,
Some Realism About Realism—Responding to Dean Pound, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 1222 (1931).
In the past two decades, legal scholars have produced a body of statistical work that
examines the determinants of legal decisionmaking.  Much of this work gives particular
attention to the influence of judicial ideology and thus dovetails with the political science
literature on judicial behavior.  See, e.g., sources cited infra note 70. R
70. Using this metric, legal scholars have documented the influence of ideology in
myriad legal fields.  For example, Cass Sunstein and his coauthors have shown that across a
range of controversial issues, there are systematic differences in voting patterns between
federal appeals judges appointed by Democratic Presidents and those appointed by
Republican Presidents.  See Cass R. Sunstein et al., Are Judges Political?  An Empirical
Analysis of the Federal Judiciary (2006) [hereinafter Sunstein et al., Are Judges Political?];
Cass R. Sunstein et al., Ideological Voting on Federal Courts of Appeals:  A Preliminary
Investigation, 90 Va. L. Rev. 301 (2004) [hereinafter Sunstein et al., Ideological Voting on
Federal Courts of Appeals].
71. For nominees to the Supreme Court, political scientists sometimes use newspaper
editorial content as a proxy for ideology.  See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover,
Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 83 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 557
(1989); Jeffrey A. Segal & Lee Epstein, Ideological Values and the Votes of Supreme Court
Justices Revisited, 57 J. Pol. 812 (1995).  For nominees to the federal appeals and district
courts, political scientists often use “common-space scores,” which model ideology as a
combination of both the appointing President and the Senators in the judge’s home state.
See, e.g., Micheal W. Giles, Virginia A. Hettinger & Todd Peppers, Picking Federal Judges:
A Note on Policy and Partisan Selection Agendas, 54 Pol. Res. Q. 623, 633, 636 (2001);
Susan W. Johnson & Donald R. Songer, The Influence of Presidential Versus Home State
Senatorial Preferences on the Policy Output of Judges on United States District Courts, 36
Law & Soc’y Rev. 657, 665–73 (2002).
72. For a sampling of that debate, see, for example, Lee Epstein & Gary King, The
Rules of Inference, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1 (2002); Daniel R. Pinello, Linking Party to Judicial
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poses, however, the party of the appointing President appears to be a
particularly appropriate measure.  This is because we are not interested
only in judicial ideology.  In light of the high degree of partisan salience
of section 2 litigation, we are also interested in the possibility that a
judge’s affiliation with a particular party itself, rather than just her ideol-
ogy, might influence her actions.  This partisan salience makes our use of
this measure at least as appropriate here as in the other doctrinal areas in
which it has been used.
To test the judicial ideology hypothesis we shift our level of analysis
from decisions, which were the focus in Part I, to the votes of individual
judges.  By analyzing individual judge-votes, we can examine the influence
of a judge’s political affiliation on her votes in section 2 liability cases.
Table 1 presents the basic finding on partisanship.  It compares the rates
at which judges appointed by Democratic and Republican Presidents
voted to assign section 2 liability.73
TABLE 1. RATES OF VOTING TO FIND SECTION 2 LIABILITY,
BY PARTY OF APPOINTING PRESIDENT
Party of Judge
Democratic Republican Difference of (1)–(2):
(1) (2) (3)
.362 .212
(.027) (.021) .149**
[307] [372] (.034)
Notes: Table provides means, standard errors in parentheses, and number of observations
in brackets. * means significant at 10% level. ** means significant at 5% level.
The data suggest that a judge’s political affiliation correlates strongly
with her votes in section 2 cases.  Democratic appointees voted to impose
liability 36.2% of the time, while Republican appointees did so only
21.2% of the time.  In other words, a Democratic appointee was more
than 50% more likely to vote in favor of liability than a Republican ap-
pointee.  Moreover, the difference is statistically significant.  The size of
the gap between Republican and Democratic appointees is comparable
to what other researchers have found in federal appellate panels.
Sunstein and his coauthors, for example, code judicial votes as liberal and
conservative across a range of legal policy issues, and they compare liberal
Ideology in American Courts:  A Meta-Analysis, 20 Just. Sys. J. 219 (1999); Gregory C. Sisk
& Michael Heise, Judges and Ideology:  Public and Academic Debates About Statistical
Measures, 99 Nw. U. L. Rev. 743 (2005); see also Joshua B. Fischman, Decision-Making
Under a Norm of Consensus:  A Structural Analysis of Three-Judge Panels 16 (July 3, 2007)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law Review), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=912299.
73. Where a judge served on both the federal district court and the federal appellate
court, we assigned the judge’s party affiliation on the basis of the judge’s initial
appointment.
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voting rates for Democratic and Republican appointees.  While their
manner of coding prevents a precise comparison of our estimates to
theirs, their figures are remarkably close to the raw averages in Table 1.
They found that the average rate at which Democratic appointees cast
liberal votes was higher than that of Republican appointees by 12 per-
centage points.74
While these data support our central hypothesis that a judge’s politi-
cal affiliation plays a significant role in Voting Rights Act litigation, it
does not explain why Democratic appointees are substantially friendlier
to section 2 plaintiffs than are Republican appointees.  There are at least
two possibilities here.  First is the conventional perception that
Democratic appointees are more favorably disposed than Republican ap-
pointees to civil rights litigation in general or minority voting rights
claims in particular.  Second, and perhaps more interestingly,
Democratic and Republican appointees may be inclined to cast votes that
favor the electoral prospects of their own political party.  In section 2
litigation, this might make Republicans less likely than Democrats to vote
in favor of liability.  As we noted above, it is commonly thought that grant-
ing relief to minority voters in many types of section 2 claims—most nota-
bly challenges to at-large election schemes that dominated section 2 liti-
gation in the 1980s and constituted a majority of claims in the 1990s—
benefits the Democratic Party in addition to minority voters.  Accord-
ingly, judges might believe that imposing section 2 liability generally fa-
vors the Democratic Party.
There is, however, an important caveat to this second possibility.
While granting relief in many types of section 2 cases is thought to benefit
the Democratic Party, there is at least one significant exception to that
conventional wisdom.  Voting rights scholars are deeply divided over the
partisan consequences of section 2 claims that concern the creation of
majority-minority districts within existing single-member district schemes.
Some commentators have argued that the creation of majority-minority
districts in such situations has harmed Democrats by packing Democratic
voters into fewer districts, wasting an excessive number of votes.75  Other
74. See Sunstein et al., Are Judges Political?, supra note 70, at 20–21. R
75. See, e.g., David Lublin, The Paradox of Representation:  Racial Gerrymandering
and Minority Interests in Congress 119 (1997) (“Republicans usually benefit from racial
redistricting, since creating new majority black districts inevitably concentrates Democrats
in a few districts.”); David Lublin & Stephen D. Voss, Racial Redistricting and Realignment
in Southern State Legislatures, 44 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 792, 805 (2000) (finding that “packing
loyal Democrats into majority-minority enclaves hurts their party, sometimes minimally,
sometimes enough to cost control of a legislative chamber”); cf. Charles Cameron, David
Epstein & Sharyn O’Halloran, Do Majority-Minority Districts Maximize Substantive Black
Representation in Congress?, 90 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 794, 809 (1996).  To be clear, this
debate is not limited to the partisan consequences of majority-minority districts.  Scholars
are also intensely interested in the consequences of drawing such districts for different
dimensions of minority representation.  See, e.g., David T. Canon, Race, Redistricting, and
Representation:  The Unintended Consequences of Black Majority Districts (1999); Carol
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researchers disagree.76  Judges aware of this debate or attuned to this
complication might be less inclined to think that section 2 claims involv-
ing majority-minority districts benefit the Democratic Party.  But such
claims appear to make up a relatively small fraction of the cases in our
dataset,77 and thus do not undermine the possibility that judges believe
that section 2 liability favors Democrats as a general matter.
Moreover, the variation in potential political consequences across
case types provides a way to test the possibility that judges are influenced
in part by the expected electoral consequences of their decisions in sec-
tion 2 cases.  If judges are carefully attuned to the partisan consequences
of section 2 litigation and believe that some types of challenges (such as
challenges to at-large districts) are more likely than others to favor
Democrats, then we might expect those types of section 2 cases to be
more polarizing than others.  In the raw data, two aspects of the cases are
correlated with a heightened degree of polarization.  The first is time.
The voting gap between Democratic and Republican appointees has
shrunk in recent years.  In cases decided during and before 1994,78 Dem-
ocratic appointees voted for liability at a rate more than 17 percentage
points higher than the rate for Republican appointees.79  But in cases
decided after 1994, the difference between Democratic and Republican
appointees was only about nine percentage points, about half of the ear-
lier difference.80  To illustrate this shift, Figure 2 shows the way in which
M. Swain, Black Faces, Black Interests:  The Representation of African Americans in
Congress (1993).
76. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Shotts, The Effect of Majority-Minority Mandates on
Partisan Gerrymandering, 45 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 120, 128 (2001) (arguing that, under certain
conditions, majority-minority mandates do not hurt Democrats, and could help them);
Lani Guinier, Don’t Scapegoat the Gerrymander, N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1995 (Magazine), at
36–37.
77. Judge-votes in reapportionment cases that do not concern at-large electoral
structures constitute only 35% of the data.  Moreover, it is unlikely that all of these cases
involve the creation of majority-minority districts that pack Democrats in ways that threaten
to undermine their partisan electoral interests.
78. We use 1994 as the dividing point for all two-period tests in the Article because it
represents the chronological mid-point of the dataset.  We attach no additional
significance to the year 1994; as the midpoint, it is merely a convenient way to measure
trends in the data.
79. In the period before 1994, Democratic appointees voted in favor of liability 43%
of the time (standard error = .036, observations = 194), while Republican appointees voted
in favor of liability 26% of the time (standard error = .030, observations = 212).
80. In the period since 1994, Democratic appointees voted in favor of liability 24% of
the time (standard error = .040, observations = 113), while Republican appointees voted in
favor of liability 15% of the time (standard error = .028, observations = 160).  These
declines are consistent with the pattern previously seen in the case-level analysis of Table 1,
which showed that the rate at which courts imposed section 2 liability was substantially
lower after 1994.  The raw data reveal that the rate at which judges voted to impose liability
fell for judges of both political parties—but that the steepest declines were among
Democratic appointees.
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the partisan gap between Democratic and Republican appointees has de-
creased over time.
FIGURE 2. FINDINGS OF LIABILITY OVER TIME
Democratic Appointees
Republican Appointees
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The second characteristic of the cases that is connected with a
greater degree of polarization between Democrats and Republicans is the
type of practice challenged.  The largest gap in the raw average voting
rates of Democratic and Republican appointees occurs in cases involving
at-large elections.  In these cases, Democratic appointees voted to impose
liability nearly 44% of the time, while their Republican appointed col-
leagues did so only 22% of the time.  The resulting 21 percentage point
gap is more than double the corresponding gap in cases not involving at-
large elections.  The gap in at-large cases is also nearly a mirror image of
the gap in reapportionment cases:  the partisan gap between Democratic
and Republican appointees is considerably smaller in reapportionment
cases than other case types.81
81. It is not surprising that the patterns for reapportionment cases closely mirror
those of the at-large cases, because only about 16% of the decisions did not fall into either
the reapportionment or at-large categories.  For completeness, we should note that,
putting to one side practice types and the year of the decision, the other characteristics of
section 2 cases that are included in Appendix I appear to correspond only modestly, if at
all, to the size of the partisan gap between Democratic and Republican appointees.  The
magnitude of the partisan gap varies only modestly by the geographic region, section 5 pre-
clearance coverage, the level of the government entity challenged, the race of the plaintiff,
and whether the proceeding was at the trial or appellate stage.  For the most part,
therefore, these data simply correspond to the patterns seen in Table 1.  The likelihood of
liability varies across these case characteristics, but the characteristics have only a modest
differential effect on the voting patterns of Democratic and Republican appointees.
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These summary statistics suggest that the ideological divisiveness of
section 2 challenges may have waned over time, and that challenges to at-
large practices may be the most ideologically divisive type of section 2
challenge.  These indications are tantalizing because they could be con-
strued as support for the argument that partisan electoral consequences
at least partly motivate judges’ decisions in section 2 cases.  They are con-
sistent with a common story about Voting Rights Act enforcement, ac-
cording to which enforcement in the 1980s centered on the dismantling
of at-large arrangements, benefiting both minority voters and the
Democratic Party, while the focus of enforcement in the 1990s shifted to
the creation of majority-minority districts within larger single-member
districting schemes, a strategy whose partisan consequences are more
deeply contested.82  If that story were in fact correct, one might expect
Democratic and Republican appointees to be more polarized in at-large
cases, because those would be the cases that most clearly favored
Democrats; and one might expect Democratic and Republican appoin-
tees to become less polarized over time, as the enforcement strategy
under the VRA became less clearly beneficial for Democrats.83
Despite the attractiveness of this account, however, caution is war-
ranted in interpreting these raw averages because they do not control for
other influences.  What appears to be convergence between Republican
and Democratic appointees might actually be the product of other
changes, such as changes over time in the mix of cases heard by each
group of judges.  Moreover, this is a potential problem even for our basic
finding about the powerful effect of judicial partisanship, because sum-
mary statistics do not permit us to control for other influences on judicial
decisionmaking.  For that reason, we revisit these findings below, after
conducting regression analysis.84
2. Panel Effects. — A judge’s partisan affiliation might have an impact
beyond the judge herself.  It might also affect other judges with whom
82. See, e.g., Issacharoff, Karlan & Pildes, supra note 21, at 657–58, 665–66; Gerken, R
supra note 40, at 1672–76 (discussing progression of vote dilution cases during 1980s and R
1990s); Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, “Bizarre Districts,” and
Voting Rights:  Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 Mich. L.
Rev. 483, 487–89 (1993) (describing shift in section 2 challenges from at-large districts to
single-member districts).  It is important to note that this common story of VRA
enforcement is in at least some tension with the snapshot of section 2 litigation that we
presented in Part I (and Appendix I).  The common account suggests that challenges to at-
large election practices dominated the early years of section 2 enforcement, while
challenges to the structure of single-member-district schemes became the focus of
litigation in the 1990s.  As the discussion in Part I shows, however, challenges to at-large
election practices continued to account for the majority of decisions issued in section 2
litigation throughout most of the 1990s.
83. Alternative explanations are also possible.  Perhaps Republican and Democratic
appointees simply agree more today than they did 20 years ago.  We do not pursue these
alternatives here, however, because our regression analysis calls into question the factual
premise of convergence over time.  See infra text accompanying note 118. R
84. See infra Part II.C.
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she sits.  Judges often sit in panels, and we might suspect that their votes
are influenced in various ways by their colleagues.  Over the last decade,
several researchers have documented these “indirect effects” or “panel
effects” of partisanship.85  This research shows that Republican or con-
servative judges are more likely to cast liberal votes when they sit on ap-
pellate panels with Democratic or liberal judges, and conversely, it indi-
cates that Democratic or liberal judges are more likely to cast conservative
votes when they sit with Republican or conservative judges.86
To test for partisan panel effects, Table 2 reports the average rates at
which judges voted to impose section 2 liability, as a function of the parti-
san composition of the court on which they sat.  The first and last rows of
the table display the voting rates of trial judges sitting alone, and the
middle rows report the results for judges sitting in panels.  The estimates
for panels include the votes of judges sitting in both trial panels and ap-
pellate panels.
The data provide evidence of panel effects.  Table 2 shows clearly
that as more Democratic appointees were added to a panel, the rate at
which a judge voted to impose liability rose.  Conversely, as more
Republican appointees were added to a panel, the rate at which a judge
voted to impose liability fell.  The incremental difference from adding
one more Republican (or one more Democrat) is relatively modest, on
the order of eight or fewer percentage points.87  But a striking pattern
emerges when one compares panels of all Democratic appointees with
panels of all Republican appointees.  The difference in rates of voting to
assign liability between these panels is 30 percentage points (=.407
−.111).  This gap swamps any of the differences in liability rates associated
with case characteristics that we discussed in Part I.  Moreover, this gap is
considerably larger than the 18 percentage point difference that exists
between Democratic and Republican appointees sitting alone in trials on
85. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 70. R
86. See, e.g., Sunstein et al., Are Judges Political?, supra note 70; Sean Farhang & R
Gregory Wawro, Institutional Dynamics on the U.S. Court of Appeals:  Minority
Representation Under Panel Decision Making, 20 J.L. Econ. & Org. 299 (2004); Revesz,
supra note 66; Sunstein et al., Ideological Voting on Federal Courts of Appeals, supra note R
70. R
87. We might expect that a judge’s vote would differ greatly when her party
commands a majority of a panel rather than a minority.  One reason might be that it is
more costly for a judge to vote her ideological preferences when she is in the minority, as
she would have to draft a dissent rather than just join a colleague’s majority opinion.
Interestingly, however, the voting patterns do not suggest a sharp difference when a
judge’s party falls out of the majority on a panel.
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section 2 liability.88  This suggests the importance of panel effects in sec-
tion 2 litigation.89
There are several possible explanations for the panel effects we ob-
serve in section 2 cases.  We can herd these explanations into two groups:
sincere voting effects and strategic voting effects.90  First, a judge’s sincere
view about the merits of a case may be affected when she interacts with
her colleagues on a judicial panel.  There are a number of ways in which
the interaction might change her views.  The presence of another judge
with different views may provide new information or insights that prompt
a judge to reevaluate her position or alter her ideological preferences.91
(Some authors refer to this possibility as “deliberation,”92 though that
88. We note that care should be taken when comparing the overall voting rates of
single judges to panel judges in Table 2 (as opposed to the way in which those rates change
as panel composition or single judge identity changes).  One difficulty is that Table 2 does
not control for the possible differences between appellate and trial judging—differences in
judicial task, in the composition of cases, etc.  A second difficulty is that the comparison of
single-trial-judge cases with panel cases in Table 2 does not isolate the difference between
trial and appellate cases.  The votes of judges sitting alone encompass only decisions made
in trials.  But the votes of judges serving on panels include decisions from both appeals and
from the special three-judge trial panels required in certain section 2 cases.  Table 2 does
not separately report the votes of judges on trial panels, because the number of such
decisions is too small to permit strong conclusions.  Moreover, no strong pattern emerges
from the small number of trial panels—all of which, it should be remembered, are
deciding state or federal reapportionment challenges.  When the trial panel was composed
entirely of Democratic appointees, the rate at which the judges voted to find liability was
43% (standard error = .111, observations = 21), which is nearly the same as the rate for
Democratic appointees sitting alone on section 2 cases involving reapportionment.  In only
two cases were the trial panels composed entirely of Republican appointees, and every
Republican appointee voted against liability in those decisions.  When Republican
appointees sat on politically mixed trial panels, they voted in favor of liability 24.3% of the
time (standard error = .072, observations = 37), which is a bit lower than the rate of 28%
for Republican appointees sitting alone on section 2 cases involving reapportionment.
89. This result is consistent with the recent research of Sunstein, Miles, and others
who have documented the existence of panel effects in other doctrinal areas.  See, e.g.,
Sunstein et al., Are Judges Political?, supra note 70; Miles & Sunstein, supra note 5.  Again R
our estimates are not precisely comparable because Sunstein and his coauthors code the
judicial votes as liberal or conservative.  But, they report that a Democratic appointee
sitting with two other Democrats casts liberal votes 64% of the time, and a Republican
appointee sitting with two other Republicans casts Republican votes 31% of the time.
90. For a general discussion of sincere and strategic voting, see Evan H. Caminker,
Sincere and Strategic Voting Norms on Multimember Courts, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 2297
(1999).
91. This effect might differ depending on whether a judge is initially in the majority
or minority of the panel.  This difference would be difficult to untangle, however, because
switching a judge from the majority to the minority likely changes his strategic calculus
significantly.  This highlights one difficulty with the effort by Sunstein and his coauthors to
distinguish “amplification” from “dampening” by defining the baseline as the voting rate of
a judge sitting with one Democrat and one Republican.  This definition implies that
“dampening” might instead reflect a judge’s response to her political party constituting a
majority of a panel.  See Sunstein et al., Are Judges Political?, supra note 70, at 9. R
92. Farhang & Wawro, supra note 86, at 325–26; Jennifer  L. Peresie, Note, Female R
Judges Matter:  Gender and Collegial Decisionmaking in the Federal Appellate Courts, 114
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TABLE 2. LIKELIHOOD OF INDIVIDUAL JUDGES VOTING IN FAVOR OF
SECTION 2 LIABILITY, BY PARTY OF APPOINTING PRESIDENT AND
PANEL PARTISAN COMPOSITION
Party of Judge Panel Composition Fraction finding § 2 liability
(A) Democratic Single Trial Judge .462
(.062)
[65]
(B) Democratic DDD .407
(.067)
[54]
(C) Democratic DDR .328
(.041)
[134]
(D) Democratic DRR .278
(.062)
[54]
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(E) Republican DDR .239
(.052)
[67]
(F) Republican RRD .213
(.040)
[108]
(G) Republican RRR .111
(.033)
[90]
(H) Republican Single Trial Judge .280
(.044)
[107]
Notes: Table provides means, standard errors in parentheses, and number of observations
in brackets. * means significant at 10% level. ** means significant at 5% level.
concept covers a number of different possible mechanisms through
which a judge’s sincere views might be affected.)  Moreover, this possibil-
ity is not limited to situations in which other panel members have differ-
ent views.  A judge’s view about a case may also change when she interacts
with panel members who share her views.  Sunstein has suggested, for
example, that when persons with similar views deliberate their views tend
to grow more extreme.93
The second possibility is that, while a judge’s sincere view is unaf-
fected by her panel colleagues, she alters her vote for strategic purposes.
She might engage in so-called logrolling—the trading of a disfavored vote
in one case in exchange for a favorable vote in another.  Accounts of
Yale L.J. 1759, 1781–82 (2005); cf. Sunstein et al., Are Judges Political?, supra note 70, at R
8–9 (using term “ideological dampening”).
93. See Sunstein et al., Are Judges Political?, supra note 70, at 71–78. R
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judicial logrolling are commonplace,94 but testing for this effect would
require data on judge-votes in a large number of cases, because any vote-
trading would not necessarily be limited to section 2 cases.  Other forms
of bargaining among judges may also be difficult to distinguish from the
persuasive effect of deliberation.  Judges may bargain over the breadth
and content of a decision in order to secure the vote of a would-be dis-
senter.95  Of course, this form of moderation—in the content of an opin-
ion—is not detectable in an analysis of judge-votes.  Relatedly, when a
judge is in the minority, drafting a dissent is time-consuming, and it may
sacrifice goodwill among colleagues.  If a dissent irks a judge’s colleagues,
it also may ultimately be counterproductive in effecting future logrolling.
Unfortunately, our data do not allow us to isolate the cause of the
panel effects we observe.  But whatever the cause, the result appears to be
dramatic:  a judge’s vote in a section 2 case is strongly influenced by the
political orientations of her colleagues.
B. The Role of Race
While partisanship is frequently front and center in Voting Rights
Act litigation, it is obviously not the only important feature of these cases.
Race is similarly salient—perhaps even more pervasively so.  The Act,
passed in the wake of the Selma marches, was enacted principally in re-
sponse to the disenfranchisement of African-Americans in the South.96
Moreover, claims raised under section 2 of the Act are brought on behalf
of racially-defined groups of voters.  Given the central role of race in this
type of litigation, we explore the question whether a judge’s race or
ethnicity correlates with his votes in section 2 cases.
Consistent with the history of the Act, more than 80% of the disposi-
tions in our data included at least one African-American plaintiff.97  In
94. Burton M. Atkins & Justin J. Green, Consensus on the United States Courts of
Appeals:  Illusion or Reality?, 20 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 735, 739–40 (1976) (describing suspicions
of judicial logrolling in federal circuit courts); Caminker, supra note 90, at 2300 (noting R
that “stark vote trading across unrelated cases [is] roundly condemned”); see also Bob
Woodward & Scott Armstrong, The Brethren 225 (1979) (suggesting Justice Brennan
voted contrary to his legal opinion to curry favor with Justice Blackmun); Farhang &
Wawro, supra note 86, at 308–09, 325 (considering but rejecting possibility that logrolling R
explains voting patterns in employment discrimination cases).
95. See Caminker, supra note 90, at 2317–20; Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati,
Trading Votes for Reasoning:  Covering in Judicial Opinions 4–7 (Duke Univ. Law Sch.
Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 166, 2007), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1010311 (on file with the Columbia  Law
Review).
96. See, e.g., David J. Garrow, Protest at Selma:  Martin Luther King, Jr. and the
Voting Rights Act of 1965, at 31–133 (1978) (discussing history of passage of Voting Rights
Act in 1965).
97. This figure makes African-American plaintiffs far and away the most common in
section 2 litigation.  After African Americans, Latino plaintiffs were the most common; at
least 30% of the decisions had a Latino plaintiff.  In some cases, of course, there were both
Latino and African-American plaintiffs.  Decisions involved plaintiffs of multiple racial
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part for this reason, we focus on the potential differences in the ways that
African-American and non-African-American judges decide section 2
cases.  An additional reason for our focus is that there are almost no
judges in our dataset who are not either African-American or white.
1. Individual Effects. — Table 3 reports the rates at which judges vote
to impose liability in section 2 cases, grouped by the race of the judge.
The data include 22 judges whom we identify as African-American, and
43 votes by these judges in section 2 liability decisions.  The data report
an average of two votes per African-American judge.
TABLE 3. RATES OF VOTING TO FIND SECTION 2 LIABILITY,
BY RACE OF JUDGE
Race of Judge
African-American Other Difference of (1)–(2):
(1) (2) (3)
(A) All Judges .558 .261 .297**
(.077) (.017) (.070)
[43] [636]
(B) Democratic .559 .337 .222**
(.086) (.029) (.087)
[34] [273]
(C) Republican .556 .204 .352**
(.176) (.021) (.137)
[9] [363]
(D) Difference of (B)–(C) .003 .133** —
(.191) (.035)
Notes: Table provides means, standard errors in parentheses, and number of observations
in brackets. * means significant at 10% level. ** means significant at 5% level. The category
of “Other” covers all racial and ethnic categories other than African-American, including
Caucasian, Asian American, Native American, and Hispanic.
Although the number of African-American judges is relatively small
in the sample, Table 3 shows that these judges are substantially more
likely to vote in favor of section 2 liability.  The African-American judges
in the data voted 56% of the time to impose liability, while the remaining
judges voted to impose liability only 26% of the time.  The nearly 30 per-
centage point difference between African-American and other judges is
more than double the size of the gap seen in Table 1 between
Democratic and Republican appointees.  This suggests that a judge’s race
has a marked effect on his voting behavior in section 2 cases.
Caution is warranted in interpreting this finding because the num-
ber of votes by African-American judges is relatively small.  Nonetheless,
groups about 23% of the time.  But even in cases involving plaintiffs of only one race,
African Americans were the plaintiffs 60% of the time.
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the difference in the voting rates of the African-American and
non-African-American judges is remarkable for its magnitude.
Moreover, the strong pattern we see is important because it contrasts
starkly with previous work on the role of race in judicial decisionmaking.
Over the past several decades, a number of studies have attempted to
identify a relationship between a judge’s race and her voting patterns.98
This earlier research focused on criminal and employment discrimina-
tion cases, presumably because these types of cases were likely to present
racially salient issues.  But the research has not unearthed any meaning-
ful differences in the decisionmaking patterns of judges of different
races.99  A series of studies on sentencing in state and municipal courts
found that white and African-American judges impose roughly similar
sentence lengths.100  Although sentence length clearly correlates with the
race of the defendant in those studies, it does not appear to correlate with
the race of the judge.101  A study of sentencing in federal district courts
similarly found no relationship between sentencing patterns and the race
of the judge.102
Interestingly, researchers have identified disparities in voting pat-
terns that correlate with the sex of a judge.  Two recent studies of federal
appellate employment discrimination decisions have found that female
judges were more likely than male judges to vote in favor of a plaintiff’s
98. This research is part of a larger body of research documenting the ways in which a
judge’s demographic characteristics and prior experience correlate with her decisions.
See infra notes 99–103 and accompanying text. R
99. Because our analysis focuses on VRA cases, it does not speak to the question
whether ideological or demographic judicial characteristics influence decisionmaking in
cases not presenting racially salient issues.  See, e.g., Orley Ashenfelter, Theodore
Eisenberg & Stewart J. Schwab, Politics and the Judiciary:  The Influence of Judicial
Background on Case Outcomes, 24 J. Legal Stud. 257, 277–81 (1995) (reporting that race,
gender, and partisan affiliation of judges does not affect outcomes in set of decisions
representing the day-to-day docket of federal trial courts).
100. Thomas M. Ulhman, Black Elite Decision Making:  The Case of Trial Judges, 22
Am. J. Pol. Sci. 884 (1978) (finding that African-American and white trial judges convict
criminal defendants at roughly same rate and impose sentences of approximately same
length); cf. Darrell Steffensmeier & Chester L. Britt, Judges’ Race and Judicial Decision
Making:  Do Black Judges Sentence Differently?, 82 Soc. Sci. Q. 749, 757–61 (2001)
(reporting weak correlations suggesting that African-American judges were more likely to
impose sentence of incarceration and gave slightly shorter average sentences).
101. Cassia Spohn, The Sentencing Decisions of Black and White Judges:  Expected
and Unexpected Similarities, 24 Law & Soc’y Rev. 1197, 1207, 1209 (1990) (finding that
African-American and white judges impose longer sentences on African-American
defendants); Susan Welch et al., Do Black Judges Make a Difference?, 32 Am. J. Pol. Sci.
126, 131–34 (1988) (reporting that African-American and white judges exhibited modest
differences by race of defendant in likelihood of sentencing defendants to incarceration
and length of incarceration).
102. Max Schanzenbach, Racial and Sex Disparities in Prison Sentences:  The Effect
of District-Level Demographic Characteristics, 34 J. Legal Stud. 57, 85 (2005).
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discrimination claim.  These studies too, however, identified no meaning-
ful impact with respect to a judge’s race.103
Our results are, we believe, the first to find a strong relationship be-
tween the race of a judge and the judge’s voting behavior.  This raises the
question why the racial differences we document in section 2 cases do not
seem to be present in other areas of the law—like employment discrimi-
nation—where we might suspect that issues of race are similarly salient.
Because our data are limited to section 2 cases, it is difficult to assess this
question.  But a possibility is that voting rights, as a central focus of the
civil rights movement and as a fundamental right long thought “preserva-
tive of all rights,”104 may possess a distinctive valence that the criminal
sentencing and employment discrimination cases do not.
Putting aside the comparison to other jurisprudential areas, there is
a more foundational question:  what might explain the fact that African-
American judges vote very differently in section 2 cases than judges who
are not African-American?  This question is a large one, and adequate
treatment of it is beyond the scope of this Article, because our data do
not permit us to offer more than speculation.  But we note a few possible
explanations.
Nearly all the non-African-American judges in our data are white, so
the question essentially reduces to why white judges are less likely than
African-American judges to vote in favor of section 2 liability.  One possi-
bility is that judges in these cases are influenced by their personal exper-
iences, and that white and African-American judges tend to have differ-
ent life experiences.  For example, African-American judges are more
likely to have suffered from racial discrimination themselves (perhaps
even discrimination in voting), and this might affect the way they view
Voting Rights Act litigation.  A closely related possibility is that judges are
influenced by the information they have acquired through life.  Given the
history in the United States of residential, social, and occupational segre-
gation, it would not be surprising if African-American and white judges
103. Farhang & Wawro, supra note 86, at 319; Peresie, supra note 92, at 1774.  Other R
studies that examined the decisions of federal district court judges across a range of legal
issues reported no effect of a judge’s race and conflicting results as to the impact of a
judge’s gender.  Jennifer A. Segal, Representative Decision Making on the Federal Bench:
Clinton’s District Court Appointees, 53 Pol. Res. Q. 137, 144–48 (2000) (concluding that
voting patterns of female and minority judges were largely similar to those of male and
white judges); Thomas G. Walker & Deborah J. Barrow, The Diversification of the Federal
Bench:  Policy and Process Ramifications, 47 J. Pol. 596, 604–11 (1985) (finding that
female and male judges voted similarly except that females were more likely to support
federal economic regulation, and male judges were more likely to support personal rights
claims and nonfemale minority issues, and reporting no significant differences by race of
judge).
104. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886); see also Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.
533, 561–62 (1964) (“[T]he right of suffrage is . . . fundamental . . . in a free and
democratic society.  Especially since the right to exercise the franchise in a free and
unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil and political rights, any alleged
infringement of the right . . . to vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized.”).
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had quite different information about the prevalence and persistence of
discrimination generally, or of discrimination in voting in particular.
In addition, there is the possibility that the African-American judges
in our dataset may simply be more liberal than the white judges in our
data.  To be sure, our findings regarding race do not appear to be driven
by the fact that most of the African-American judges in our data are
Democrats.  Table 3 shows that even within each party the effect of race is
strong.  African-American Democratic appointees are more than 20 per-
centage points more likely to vote in favor of liability than other
Democratic appointees.  A similar pattern obtains for Republican appoin-
tees (though the number of observations is too small for the pattern to be
meaningful).  And as we will explain below, controlling simultaneously
for race and party in our regressions does not undermine the significance
of either.105
Still, the party of the appointing President is obviously a crude proxy
for the political ideology of each judge.  This binary variable might mask
ideological variation among judges who were all appointed by Presidents
of the same party.  If the ideological variation among appointees of the
same party were strongly correlated with race, that could explain our re-
sult above.  (In other words, using party as a proxy cannot eliminate the
possibility that African-American Democratic appointees are more liberal
than white Democratic appointees.)  But even if we use other, more fine-
grained measures of political ideology—measures that account for both
the ideological differences among Presidents of the same party and for
the role that senatorial courtesy plays in the judicial appointments pro-
cess—we still uncover no evidence that African-American appointees of
either party are more liberal than other appointees of that party.106  Ac-
cordingly, one should be at least somewhat skeptical of the intuition that
the African-American Democratic appointees in our dataset are systemati-
cally more liberal than other Democratic appointees.107
105. See infra Part II.C.
106. For a more fine-grained measure, we use the Rosenthal-Poole scores discussed
below.  See infra note 117.  According to our calculations, when senatorial courtesy is not R
considered, the average common space score for the African-American Democratic
appointees in these data is −.45 while the average for other Democratic appointees is −.43.
Adjusting for senatorial courtesy on district court appointments, these figures are −.38 and
−.37, respectively.  Although the number of African-American Republican appointees in
our data is small, their common space scores are also very close to those of the other
Republicans in the data.  When senatorial courtesy is not considered, the average common
space score for the African-American Republican appointees in these data is .49, and the
average for other Republican appointees is .47.  When senatorial courtesy is considered for
district court judges, these figures are both .41.  Using this measure of political ideology,
African-American judges appear essentially identical to their white co-partisans.
107. Other biographical characteristics of the judges provide additional reasons to be
skeptical of this possibility.  For example, judges who previously served as prosecutors are
often thought to be more conservative.  Yet, in our data, 29% of the white judges previously
served as prosecutors, compared to 55% of the African-American judges.  Thus, their prior
professional experience does not obviously suggest liberal views.
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Even if further research uncovered evidence that African-American
judges were systematically more liberal than other judges appointed by
Presidents of the same political party, that would not undermine our re-
sults.  We are interested in the question whether African-American fed-
eral judges exhibit significantly different voting behavior in voting rights
cases than their (mostly white) counterparts.  Our results uncover just
such a difference.  If it turns out that that difference is the product of
more liberal views among African-American judges, that simply raises new
questions—about why white and African-American appointees of the
same party have systematically different ideological views, and about why
those different views do not produce different voting patterns in other
doctrinal arenas.
2. Panel Effects. — Like political affiliation, it is possible that the race
of a judge exerts a panel effect.  For this reason, we examine the possibil-
ity that the presence of an African-American judge on a panel affects the
votes of his colleagues.  Again, the small number of African-American
judges in our data counsels us to take care interpreting these data.  Still,
the data contain 28 panel decisions in which an African-American
judge participated.108  These panels include 54 observations of a
non-African-American judge sitting on a panel with a judge who is
African-American.109  Table 4 compares the votes of these non-African-
American judges with the votes of judges on panels that did not include
an African-American judge.
The first row of the table shows that the judges were more likely to
cast a vote for section 2 liability when they served on a panel with an
African-American judge.  The impact is quite large; the probability that a
judge voted to impose liability was 19 percentage points higher when an
African-American judge was a member of the panel.  The effect is larger
than that of changing the political party of two judges on the panel.  As
shown in Table 2, the difference in the likelihood of a Democratic
appointee voting in favor of liability changes by 13 percentage points
when she goes from sitting with two Democrats to sitting with two
Republicans.110  Similarly, the difference in the probability of a
Republican appointee voting in favor of liability changes by 13 percent-
age points when she goes from sitting with two Republicans to sitting with
two Democrats.  Thus, the panel effects of race in section 2 cases appear
greater than these partisan panel effects.
108. Twenty of these were appellate panels.  The remaining eight were trial panels.
109. Because the panels all have three members, each panel with a single African-
American judge provides two observations of a non-African-American judge sitting with an
African-American judge.  If all 28 panels in this subset of the data had a single African-
American judge, this would provide 56 observations.  Our data include two panels on
which there were two African-American judges, however, which accounts for the fact that
there are only 54 observations in Table 4.
110. See supra Part II.A.2.
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TABLE 4. RATES OF VOTING TO FIND SECTION 2 LIABILITY,
BY PANEL RACIAL COMPOSITION
Did the Panel Include an
African-American Judge?
Votes by Judges who are
Not African-American Yes No Difference of (1)–(2):
Serving on Panels (1) (2) (3)
(A) Votes by All Such .407 .220 .188**
Judges (.067) (.021) (.061)
[54] [423]
(B) Votes by Such Judges .550 .289 .261**
who are Democratic (.114) (.032) (.108)
Appointees [20] [197]
(C) Votes by Such Judges .324 .159 .164**
who are Republican (.081) (.024) (.070)
Appointees [34] [226]
(D) Difference of (B)–(C) .226* .130** —
(.138) (.040)
Notes: Table provides means, standard errors in parentheses, and number of observations
in brackets. * means significant at 10% level. ** means significant at 5% level.
The next two rows demonstrate that the panel effect of race bears on
judges of both political parties.  Although the number of observations is
quite small when the data are decomposed by political party, the pattern
is striking.  When an African-American judge was a member of the panel,
the likelihood that a judge voted in favor of liability rose by 26 percent-
age points for Democratic appointees and by 16 percentage points for
Republican appointees.  Relative to the size of the panel effects from po-
litical affiliation, the magnitude of this effect is especially dramatic.  In
Table 2, the panel effects of political affiliation were cumulative, meaning
that the addition of a second member of a particular political party to the
panel appeared to exert just as much influence on a judge’s vote as did
the addition of the first member of that political party.  Whether the ef-
fect of race similarly increases with the number of African-American
judges on the panel is uncertain.  Only one case in the data involved a
panel with two African-American judges, and no case involved a panel
with three African-American judges.  However, the evidence in Table 4
indicates that the presence of any African-American judge on the panel
has a strong influence on the votes of the other panel members.
These results reflect perhaps the first evidence that the presence of a
minority judge on a judicial panel influences the votes of other members
of that panel.  Previous scholarship has tested for, but not found, evi-
dence of panel effects by race.111  This is particularly interesting in light
111. See Farhang & Wawro, supra note 86, at 326 (finding racial composition of R
panels in federal court of appeals does not significantly affect outcome); Peresie, supra
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of the fact that other sorts of panel effects related to identity have been
uncovered.  For example, Peresie and others have found that a federal
appellate judge’s sex can produce a panel effect in employment discrimi-
nation cases:  a male judge becomes more likely to vote in favor of a
plaintiff in such cases when he sits with a female judge.112  Until now,
however, no research had brought to light panel effects related to race.
The question why a judge’s race would affect the voting behavior of
his colleagues on a panel is extremely interesting—and is almost entirely
ignored by the existing empirical literature of judicial behavior.  Because
this literature has struggled to identify any effect of race on judicial be-
havior, it is not surprising that the potential peer effects of race have
been overlooked.  But this effect in section 2 cases appears to be quite
powerful.  Why does the race of colleagues on a panel matter so much?
And why does it appear to matter even more than the colleague’s politics?
Again, it is beyond the scope of this paper to provide anything like a
full answer to this question.  Still, the potential causes of panel effects that
we discussed earlier provide a few possibilities.113  The vast majority of
section 2 litigation is brought by African-American plaintiffs, and nearly
all the judges in our dataset who are not African American are white.  In
light of this, why might a white judge vote differently when he sits with an
African-American judge in a section 2 case?  One possibility is that the
white judge’s sincere view of the merits of the case changes when he de-
liberates with an African-American judge.  The African-American judge
may have different experiences or information relating to discriminatory
practices, and this might lead the white judge to reevaluate his view.
Moreover, beyond experience or information, there are a number of
other ways in which the presence of an African-American judge during
deliberations might change the conversation and, as a consequence, the
sincere views of other panel members.
Strategic behavior is a possibility here as well.  For example, on
panels where an African-American judge votes in favor of liability, a white
judge might worry that the social sanction for voting against liability
could be greater than in cases with no African-American panel members.
Logrolling also might be present, though it is difficult to determine how
prevalent logrolling would be.  If African-American judges have particu-
larly intense preferences with respect to section 2 cases, then logrolling
might be quite frequent when they sit on panels.  This is because their
intense preferences would motivate them to trade more votes on other
note 92, at 1774 (noting “past research has not generally borne out [the] expectation” that R
“minority judges are more likely to make liberal decisions than white judges”).
112. See Farhang & Wawro, supra note 86, at 324 (finding “male judges vote more R
liberally when one woman serves on a panel with them”); Peresie, supra note 92, at 1778 R
(concluding that presence of female judge on panel “more than doubled the probability
that a male judge ruled for the plaintiff”).
113. See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing effects of judge’s colleagues on both her sincere
and strategic voting preferences).
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cases in order to obtain the votes of fellow panel members in section 2
cases.  On the other hand, if vote trading is often limited to similar types
of cases, or if African-American judges have different preferences than
other judges across a whole host of cases, then African-American judges
will have difficulty engaging in logrolling.  After all, if they are consigned
to a near-permanent voting minority on panels, other panel members
may have no need or desire to bargain with them.
C. The Robustness of Partisanship and Race
Our summary statistics suggest that a judge’s votes are affected by
her own partisanship and race, as well as the partisanship and race of
other judges with whom she sits.  But as we discussed in Part I, there are
many features of section 2 cases that might affect the likelihood that a
judge votes in favor of liability.  To confirm the influence of partisanship
and race in Voting Rights Act litigation, it is important to be sure that the
patterns observed in the raw data regarding the role of these features are
robust—that is, that they are not actually the product of some other char-
acteristics of section 2 litigation that happen to be correlated with the
partisanship or race of the judges.
In the following discussion, we use multivariate regression analysis to
control simultaneously for multiple features that might influence section
2 liability.  While the details of the analysis that follows are somewhat
technical, our basic conclusion is straightforward:  the econometric ap-
proach confirms our central findings about the importance of both judi-
cial race and judicial partisanship.
1. Partisanship. — To test the robustness of our hypothesis about
partisanship, we use regression analysis to estimate the probability that a
judge votes in favor of a section 2 plaintiff as a function of the judge’s
partisan affiliation, the judge’s race, and a variety of other characteristics
of the judge and the case.  We employ several different specifications of
the regression model to evaluate the robustness of the estimates for parti-
sanship and race.114  Table 5 presents the first set of regression results.115
114. We estimated the probability that judge i in case j in circuit c and year t votes in
favor of liability with probit regressions in the form Pr(Voteijct) = Demi + Zit + Xjct + ac + at +
eijct.  The dependent variable Pr(Voteijct) represents the probability that judge i in case j in
year t and circuit c votes for the plaintiff.  In this equation, Demi is a binary variable taking
the value one when a Democratic President appointed judge i and zero otherwise.  The
term Xjct reflects a matrix of variables that are specific to case j, and Zit contains variables
reflecting characteristics of judge i, some of which may vary over time.  The binary variables
ac and at are fixed effects for circuit c and year t.  The term eijct is an error term.
115. To make it easier to interpret our results, the regression results in Table 5 show
the marginal effects for each explanatory variable instead of the regression coefficients.
This simply means that the numbers listed in Table 5 reflect percentage changes in the
likelihood of a judge finding liability.  To see this, consider for example the first row of
Table 5.  This row shows how much more likely a judge was to vote in favor of liability if the
“Judge Was Democratic Appointee.”  Under our first regression (in Column (1)), the
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TABLE 5. LIKELIHOOD OF INDIVIDUAL JUDGES VOTING FOR SECTION 2
LIABILITY: PROBIT REGRESSION ANALYSIS FOCUSING ON
POLITICAL AFFILIATION
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Judge Was Democratic .145** .151** .158** .163** .164** .150**
Appointee (.035) (.037) (.044) (.042) (.041) (.037)
Judge Was Democratic — — −.021 — — —
Appointee * Year Was After (.072)
1994
One Additional Dem. — — — .044 — —
Appointee on Panel (.050)
Two Additional Dem. — — — .121 — —
Appointees on Panel (.088)
One Additional Dem. — — — — .114* —
Appointee on Appellate (.063)
Panel
Two Additional Dem. — — — — .226** —
Appointees on Appellate (.110)
Panel
Case Occurred in Juris- — — — — — −.242**
diction Covered by § 5 * (.075)
Appellate Case
Year Was After 1994 −.123** — — — — —
(.050)
Case Occurred in South .016 — — — — —
(.057)
Appellate Case −.084 −.102* −.103* −.138** −.203** −.019
(.051) (.053) (.053) (.062) (.069) (.062)
Challenge to At-large .104 .078 .077 .078 .086 .079
Election (.070) (.069) (.070) (.070) (.069) (.069)
Challenge to Reapportion- .054 .034 .034 .027 .049 .034
ment Plan (.073) (.073) (.073) (.073) (.074) (.073)
Challenge to Local Election .005 −.018 −.018 .014 .001 −.008
Practice (.059) (.062) (.062) (.066) (.061) (.062)
Plaintiffs Were African- .027 .114* .114* .116* .120* .109
American (.068) (.064) (.064) (.064) (.062) (.067)
Case Occurred in Juris- .046 .045 .045 .045 .047 .253**
diction Covered by § 5 (.063) (.069) (.068) (.068) (.069) (.098)
Log-likelihood −378.540 −343.654 −343.618 −342.084 −339.965 −338.245
Pseudo-R2 .0595 .1273 .1274 .1313 .1366 .1410
Notes: * means significant at 10% level. ** means significant at 5% level. With the exception of Model (1), all
regressions also include fixed-effects controls for judicial circuits and years. For Model (1), the number of
observations is 679; for subsequent models, the number of observations is 653. The subsequent models
exclude 26 observations because fixed-effects estimates cannot be obtained for one circuit (the D.C. Circuit)
and certain years due to the lack of variation in judge votes within that circuit and those years.
a. Judge Partisanship. — The regressions confirm that a judge’s politi-
cal affiliation influences her votes in section 2 cases.  Models (1) and (2)
of Table 5 display estimates from an equation that includes the variables
marginal effect is .145, which means that a judge was 14.5 percentage points more likely to
vote in favor of liability if she is a Democrat rather than a Republican.
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examined in Part I, as well as a number of other variables.116  Those mod-
els indicate that appointment by a Democratic President rather than a
Republican one implies an almost 15 percentage point increase in the
chance that the judge votes to impose section 2 liability.  This estimate is
statistically significant at the 5% level.  It shows that the partisan gap be-
tween Republican and Democratic appointees is unaffected by the pres-
ence of controls for the additional characteristics of the cases, courts, and
judges.  Moreover, the size of this estimate is almost identical to the dif-
ference observed in the simple averages of Table 1, where Democratic
appointees voted 36% of the time to impose liability and Republican ap-
pointees did so 21% of the time.117
In addition to confirming our central hypothesis about the impor-
tance of partisanship, the regression framework permits us to test our
earlier speculation that some cases were more ideologically polarized
than others.  The summary statistics suggested that cases decided before
1995, as well as cases challenging at-large electoral structures, were more
116. The only difference between Model (1) and Model (2) is that Model (2) (as well
as the remainder of the models in Table 5 and Table 6) includes so-called fixed effects for
years and judicial circuits.  See supra note 114 (explaining formula for Model (2)).  The R
fixed effects control for systematic variation across circuits and years in the probability a
judge votes for a section 2 plaintiff.  These systematic differences might arise from
variations in legal doctrine or judicial attitudes across circuits and time.  Model (1) does
not include controls for these effects.  Instead, it includes an indicator variable for the
South and an indicator variable for all years following 1994.  (This is why only Model (1)
includes values for the variables for whether the case occurred after 1994 or in the South.)
We include the simpler specification in Model (1) because it facilitates our discussion in
Part II.D about variation across region and period in the likelihood a judge favors a section
2 plaintiff.
117. Moreover, these results are robust to other measures of political ideology.
Although we report estimates using the party of the appointing President, we noted above
that other ideological proxies are available.  One of the most common, developed by
political scientists Howard Rosenthal and Keith Poole, assigns judges the common space
scores of their appointing Presidents.  Keith T. Poole & Howard Rosenthal, Congress:  A
Political-Economic History of Roll Call Voting (1997); Keith T. Poole, Recovering a Basic
Space from a Set of Issue Scales, 42 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 954 (1998).  This measure of judicial
ideology is sometimes adjusted to reflect the practice of “senatorial courtesy,” which
provides a role for home-state senators in the selection of judicial appointees.  See Giles et
al., supra note 71, at 623 (finding that when “senatorial courtesy” is relevant in the judicial R
selection process any link between presidential preferences and judicial outcomes
disappears).  We reestimated the regressions using these common space measures rather
than the party of the appointing President.  Both measures showed a substantial and
statistically significant impact for judicial ideology.  The basic Rosenthal-Poole measure
produced a coefficient of −.166 (standard error = .040).  When we adjusted this measure
for the practice of senatorial courtesy in the appointment of district court judges (for
whom the practice is most robust), the estimate was −.193 (standard error = .043).  These
estimates imply that a judge who is most conservative favors the voting rights plaintiff less
often than a politically neutral judge by about 16 to 19 percentage points.  The insensitivity
of our conclusions about the influence of judicial ideology to the particular measure used
is consistent with other research on judicial decisionmaking.  See, e.g., Sisk & Heise, supra
note 72, at 794 (showing that party of appointing President and common space scores lead R
to similar inferences about effect of judicial ideology in religious freedom cases).
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polarized than cases decided later and cases challenging reapportion-
ment schemes.  Model (3) tests for changes in the level of polarization
over time.  This model includes a control variable that interacts the varia-
ble for a Democratic appointment with the indicator variable for a deci-
sion occurring after the year 1994.  If the partisan gap in voting rates has
grown over time, the estimated effect for this interaction term should be
positive.  But, if the partisan gap in voting has shrunk over time, the esti-
mated effect on the interaction term should be negative.
Model (3) shows that the estimate for this term, -.021, is only about
two percentage points, and far from conventional levels of statistical sig-
nificance.  The nearly zero value of this estimate implies that the magni-
tude of the partisan gap in the likelihood of voting for liability is essen-
tially the same before 1994 as it is after 1994.  Although not reported
here, when other years were chosen for the interaction term, the esti-
mates were similarly close to zero.  Moreover, the inclusion of the interac-
tion term has virtually no effect on the magnitude of the estimate for a
Democratic appointment itself.  The estimate of .158 is essentially identi-
cal to the estimate of .151 in Model (2), and it remains statistically signifi-
cant.  Thus, it is tempting to conclude that the partisan gap does not
trend significantly over time.
But it is worth noting that the standard errors on the interaction
term are relatively large.  Their size means that we cannot reject the possi-
bility that the coefficient on the interaction term is equal to -.158—the
value that would indicate that Democratic appointees voted identically to
Republican appointees in the post-1994 period.  In other words, the im-
precision of the estimates prevent us from either rejecting or accepting
the hypothesis that in more recent years the partisan gap vanished.
Somewhat similar results obtain when we test for the possibility that
the level of ideological divisiveness differs across case type.  When we in-
teract the variable for a Democratic appointment with the indicator varia-
ble for whether a case involved a challenge to an at-large election, the
estimate for the interaction term is .095 (standard error = .077).118  The
baseline estimate for a Democratic appointment falls to .101 (standard
error = .051) but remains statistically significant at the 5% level.  Al-
though the coefficient on the interaction term is imprecisely estimated,
its magnitude is consistent with the summary statistics and suggests that
challenges to at-large election practices are particularly divisive. This find-
ing provides potential support for the theory that challenges to at-large
practices are more polarizing because the partisan consequences of dis-
mantling an at-large election system are often so clear.
b. Panel Effects. — As we explained in Table 2 above, the raw data
revealed a pattern of partisan panel effects in section 2 cases.  The next
regressions in Table 5 test for the continued presence of partisan panel
effects after conditioning on other factors.  Model (4) includes two binary
118. To conserve space, this result is not reported in Table 5.
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variables for whether a judge cast her vote while sitting with one or two
Democratic appointees.  The estimated coefficients for these variables as-
cend in magnitude.  The estimated impact of one Democratic co-panelist
is about four percentage points.  The point estimate for sitting with two
Democratic co-panelists is a 12 percentage point increase in the likeli-
hood that the judge votes in favor of liability.  The pattern of the esti-
mates is thus roughly consistent with the summary statistics reported in
Table 3:  a greater number of Democrats on the panel raises a judge’s
likelihood of voting in favor of liability.  But neither of these estimates are
statistically different from zero.
It is important to note, however, that the specification of Model (4)
captures panel effects in both trial and appellate panels.  The existing
literature on panel effects studies only appellate panels, because the stan-
dard structure in federal court is that three-judge panels preside only at
the appellate stage.  Section 2 provides for special three-judge trial panels
in some cases,119 and this feature of section 2 provides an interesting way
to test whether the partisan composition of trial panels exerts an influ-
ence similar to that of appellate panels.  The panel effect of partisan com-
position may be less pronounced at the trial stage than at the appellate
stage for several reasons.  Panel trials are so rare that judges may have no
expectation of repeat play, which may be an important facilitator of coop-
eration or bargaining.  The process of fact-finding at the trial stage may
allow fewer opportunities for the assertion of judicial policy preferences,
and thus trials may be less susceptible to panel influences than the review
of these decisions and related questions of law.
Unfortunately, the small number of section 2 trial panels—again,
only 36 decisions—precludes a direct test of whether panel effects are
greater in appellate rather than trial courts.  Still, we can attempt to iso-
late better panel effects in appellate courts by examining only the appel-
late panels.  Model (5) does this, replacing the variables for the partisan
composition of both trial and appellate panels with variables for the parti-
san composition of only appellate panels.  This focus produces strikingly
different results.  At 11.4%, and 22.6%, respectively, the estimated effects
for partisan composition on appellate panels are more than double the
magnitude of the estimates for all panels in Model (4).  Moreover, the
estimate for the presence of three Democrats on the appellate panel is
statistically significant.
The presence of the variables for panel composition has some effect
on the estimated impact of appointment by a Democratic President.  In
Models (4) and (5), the estimated effect for a Democratic appointment
remains statistically significant and its magnitude changes little.  These
estimates imply that a trial judge who was appointed by a Democratic
President is more likely than a Republican trial judge to vote in favor of
liability by about 16 percentage points.  When evaluated together, the es-
119. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. R
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timated impact of partisan appointment and panel composition are siza-
ble for appellate judges:  the probability that a Democratic appointee
serving on an appellate panel with two fellow Democrats votes in favor of
liability is about 23 percentage points higher than that of a Democrat
serving on an appellate panel with two Republicans.120  In sum, after con-
trolling for other factors, the precision of the estimates of partisan panel
effects is weaker, but the magnitude of the estimates remains quite
large.121
2. Race. — The summary statistics in Tables 3 and 4 suggest that a
judge’s race and the race of other panel members correlate strongly with
that judge’s vote on section 2 liability.  While those tables focused on race
because of its particular salience in Voting Rights Act litigation, we col-
lected considerably more detailed information about the judges from the
Federal Judicial Center.  Table 6 presents the results of regressions that
consider the effect of a variety of demographic characteristics and prior
experience of the judges.  These regressions allow us to confirm the ro-
bustness of our findings about the explanatory power of race, as well as
test for the influence of other biographical characteristics on judicial
behavior.
Another reason why it is important to control for a judge’s race is
that the close correlation of judicial race and partisanship suggests that
120. The other implied magnitudes are also large.  For example, the probability that a
Democrat serving on an appellate panel with two other Democrats votes in favor of liability
is about 19 percentage points (.164 + .226 − .0203) higher than that of a Republican judge
presiding alone at trial.
121. In addition to testing for partisan panel effects, we also tested for whether the
partisan composition of the circuit court influences the decisions of judges both on three-
member appellate panels and at the trial stage.  Judges may cast their votes in the shadow
of en banc review, and thus the partisan composition of the circuit may influence their
decisionmaking.  A judge may be less likely to vote according to her ideological
preferences when the partisan composition of the circuit makes it likely that her decision
would be undone by a rehearing en banc.  Although not reported in Table 5 to conserve
space, we tested for this simple account of strategic ideological voting by including a term
for the difference between the number of active Democratic appointees in the circuit and
the number of active Republican appointees.  These counts exclude judges who have taken
senior status because senior judges do not cast votes in determining whether a case is
reheard en banc, and once it has been reheard en banc, they generally do not participate
in the decision on the case.  When the number of Democrats exceeds the number of
Republicans, this figure is positive; when they are equally matched, it is zero; and when
Republicans exceed Democrats, it is negative.  If a more Democratic circuit raises the
likelihood that a judge will vote in favor of section 2 liability, the estimated effect of this
variable should be positive.
This model shows that the political composition of the circuit has essentially no
relationship to the probability that a judge votes to impose liability under section 2.  The
estimate is statistically insignificant and small in magnitude.  If taken at face value, the
estimate implies that in a circuit in which there were ten more active Democratic
appointees than Republicans, which would be an extraordinarily unbalanced circuit, the
effect would still be less than the effect of the judge’s own partisan pedigree.  The estimate
provides no support for the view that judges cast ideological votes strategically in section 2
cases in response to the partisan composition of the circuit.
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the failure to control for a judge’s race may bias upward the estimated
influence of partisanship.  The African-American judges in the data are
disproportionately Democratic appointees (which mirrors the partisan af-
filiation of African Americans generally), and the averages in Table 3 in-
dicate that they are more likely to vote in favor of liability than white
judges.  These two features of the data—the strong correlation between
race and partisanship, and the higher rates at which African-American
judges vote in favor of liability—raise the possibility that the estimated
effect of Democratic appointment may be an artifact of the voting behav-
ior of African-American Democratic judges rather than the general ten-
dency of Democratic judges to vote in favor of liability.
a. Individual Effects. — Model (1) in Table 6 tests for the importance
of a judge’s demographic characteristics on his decisionmaking in section
2 cases by including explanatory variables for the race and gender of the
judge.  The estimate for race is astonishingly large:  even after controlling
for other factors, an African-American judge is 30 percentage points
more likely than a judge who is not African-American to vote in favor of
section 2 liability.  Again, the number of African-American judges in the
data is relatively low, and a switch in just a few votes of these judges could
affect the magnitude of the estimate substantially.  But it is compelling
that the additional explanatory variables do little to reduce the striking
racial gap in voting rates seen in Table 3.
The estimated effect of gender provides a sharp contrast.  Male and
female judges appear to have virtually the same voting rates.  The esti-
mate implies that a female judge is only one percentage point less likely
to vote in favor of liability, and the estimate is far from statistical signifi-
cance.  The contrast between the strong effect of race and the absence of
an effect for gender may reflect that race is highly salient under the
Voting Rights Act while gender is not.
Importantly, the presence of controls for a judge’s race and gender
has little impact on our findings regarding partisanship.  The estimated
difference between Republican and Democratic appointees remains
highly statistically significant.  Moreover, the magnitude of the estimated
partisan effect is only slightly smaller than in the model that lacked race
and gender controls—about 12.5 percentage points rather than 15—and
the two estimates are statistically indistinguishable.122  The estimates sup-
port the conclusion that partisan affiliation exerts an influence on voting
behavior independent from that of race.
The race finding is especially compelling because other demo-
graphic factors that we might think would be important turn out to have
no significant effect on the likelihood that a judge votes in favor of sec-
tion 2 liability.  The last three models in Table 6 examine other character-
istics of the judges, but none of them exert a large or statistically signifi-
cant effect.  Model (4) includes the judge’s age in years as a control
122. Compare Model (1) in Table 5 with Model (1) in Table 6.
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TABLE 6. LIKELIHOOD OF INDIVIDUAL JUDGES VOTING FOR SECTION 2
LIABILITY: PROBIT REGRESSION ANALYSIS FOCUSING ON
JUDICIAL CHARACTERISTICS
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Judge Was Democratic .125** .128** .130** .140** .166** .155**
Appointee (.037) (.038) (.038) (.037) (.039) (.038)
Judge Was African- .300** .353** .350** — — —
American (.081) (.093) (.088)
Judge Was Female −.020 — — — — —
(.056)
At Least One African- — .255** — — — —
American Judge on Panel (.110)
At Least One African- — — .398** — — —
American Judge on (.118)
Appellate Panel
Judge’s Age — — — .003 — —
(.002)
Judge Attended Ivy League — — — — .018 —
College (.051)
Judge Attended Elite Law — — — — −.078* —
School (.041)
Judge Previously Served — — — — .016 —
as Law Clerk (.044)
Judge Previously Served in — — — — — .021
State Legislative or (.039)
Executive Branch
Judge Previously Served on — — — — — −.056
State Court (.040)
Judge Previously Served in — — — — — −.002
Federal Legislative or (.036)
Executive Branch
Log-likelihood −337.442 −332.257 −328.255 −342.188 −342.315 −342.718
Pseudo-R2 .1430 .1562 .1664 .1295 .1307 .1296
Notes: * means significant at 10% level. ** means significant at 5% level. These regressions include the same
controls as in Model (2) of Table 5: controls for whether the case occurred in a jurisdiction covered by
section 5, whether the case was an appeal, whether the plaintiffs were African-American, whether the
challenge was to an at-large election scheme or a reapportionment plan, whether the governing body
challenged was local, and fixed-effect controls for judicial circuits and years.  As described in the note to Table
5, the number of observations for each of these models is 653.
variable.  The estimate is statistically insignificant and predicts a weak ef-
fect of age.  An additional decade of age raises the probability of voting in
favor of liability by only three percentage points.  Model (5) examines the
nature of the judge’s education.  The largest estimate is minus eight per-
centage points for a judge having attended an elite law school.123  But
this estimate is half of the magnitude of that for partisan affiliation, and it
is only marginally statistically significant.  The estimates for attendance at
an Ivy League college and clerkship experience are each two percentage
123. The classification of law schools as elite is a judgment that varies across time and
surely involves some subjectivity.  We erred on the side of an underinclusive list and coded
only Yale, Harvard, Stanford, Chicago, Columbia, and Michigan as elite.
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points or less and are not statistically significant.  The final model in-
cludes explanatory variables reflecting the nature of a judge’s prior expe-
rience in government, if any.  One of these binary variables captures
whether the judge previously served on a state court.  Two more variables
measure whether the judge had experience in the political branches:
one measures service in the executive branch or legislature at the state
level, and the other reflects analogous experience at the federal level.  As
with the education and training variables, none of the prior government
service estimates are statistically significant.  Even if taken at face value,
each of them implies an effect of less than six percentage points.  The
weakness of the estimates for these dimensions of a judge’s experience
indicates that, in contrast to race, these aspects of a judge’s background
have little connection to how judges decide section 2 claims.
b. Panel Effects. — Models (2) and (3) in Table 6 explore whether
race, like partisan affiliation, influences the votes of other judges on the
panel.  Model (2) suggests that race generates substantial panel effects.
The estimate implies that a white judge is almost 26 percentage points
more likely to vote in favor of liability when she sits on a panel with an
African-American judge.  The magnitude of this estimate is quite large.  It
is nearly double the magnitude of the estimated impact of a judge’s own
partisan affiliation.  When the panel effect of race is restricted to appel-
late panels in Model (3), the estimated impact is even larger.  While this
estimate relies on the small number of observations in which an appellate
panel included an African-American judge, it implies that the panel effect
of race is greater on appellate panels than on trial panels.  This pattern is
consistent with the partisan panel effects which the models in Table 5
revealed were more pronounced on appellate panels.  Furthermore, the
inclusion of a control variable for a racial panel effect leaves virtually un-
disturbed the estimate for partisan effect.  The estimate for a Democratic
appointment is 13 percentage points, which is nearly the same as the esti-
mates that emerged from the other regression specifications.
D. The Conventional Account Redux
Our results show that partisanship and race play a significant role in
the adjudication of section 2 cases.  In Part I, however, we began with a
different set of factors that are conventionally thought to play a signifi-
cant role in the outcome of these cases:  (1) the type of practice chal-
lenged (at-large or reapportionment?  local or state?), (2) the location of
the challenged practice (in the South? in a covered jurisdiction?), and
(3) the date of the lawsuit.  What do our findings mean for the signifi-
cance of these characteristics?  The regression results call into question
the claim that all these characteristics are important determinants of
liability.
1. Time. — One piece of conventional wisdom about Voting Rights
Act litigation we can confirm:  the number of cases and the plaintiff suc-
cess rate have declined over time.  The raw data in Appendix I and the
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discussion in Part I support the view about the declining number of cases.
Almost two-thirds of the liability determinations occurred before 1994—
that is, in the first half of the period that we studied.  Thus, the volume of
section 2 decisions concerning liability has trended downward.
Both the raw data and the regression analysis support the second
part of this conventional wisdom as well—that the plaintiff success rate
has also fallen since 1982.  The raw data show that the rate at which
courts found violations of section 2 was 16 percentage points lower after
1994 than before.124  Model (1) of Table 5 provides additional support
for this conclusion.125  The coefficient on the variable for the post-1994
period implies (with statistical significance) that judges were 12 percent-
age points less likely to vote in favor of liability after 1994.126  Thus, even
after controlling for other characteristics, the rate at which the average
judge favors section 2 plaintiffs has generally declined.127
2. Location. — Model (1) in Table 5 also allows us to reassess the
importance of region in the likelihood that a judge votes in favor of sec-
tion 2 liability.  In the model, the estimate for the southern region im-
plies that a judge’s likelihood of voting in favor of liability was higher by
only two percentage points when the case occurred inside rather than
outside the South.128  This result contrasts with the raw data, which
showed somewhat higher rates of liability in southern cases.129  Model (1)
indicates that after controlling for the other explanatory variables in the
regression, the probability that a judge votes for liability has only a weak
relationship to whether the case occurred in the South.
Perhaps more importantly, the models in Table 5 call into question
the conventional claim that judges are more likely to favor liability when
the challenge originates in a jurisdiction covered by the preclearance pro-
124. See infra Appendix I, row (B).
125. As we noted above, Model (1) includes a variable for whether the case was
decided after 1994, rather than controls for year fixed effects.  See supra note 116. R
126. The other models do not report the estimates for the circuit and year fixed
effects in order to conserve space.  But the coefficients on the year fixed effects in these
models confirm the patterns already observed in the data.  They indicate that the
likelihood that a judge voted in favor of a section 2 plaintiff was lower in each subsequent
year than it was in 1982.
127. The estimate for the post-1994 period captures the decline in the average rate at
which judges vote for section 2 plaintiffs.  As previously discussed, Model (3) of Table 5
could neither confirm nor reject that the gap between Democrats and Republicans in the
rates at which they favored section 2 plaintiffs was relatively constant over time.
128. As we noted above, Model (1) includes a variable for whether the case was
decided in the South, rather than controls for circuit fixed effects.  See supra note 116. R
129. The estimates for the circuit fixed effects in the other models are consistent with
the finding in Model (1) that the South is not an important explanatory variable.  With
one small exception, the circuit fixed effects did not indicate that judges in any circuit
were more likely to vote in favor of the plaintiff than judges sitting in any other circuit.
The only exception is the First Circuit:  relative to judges in the First Circuit, all other
judges were more likely to vote in favor of the plaintiff.  This result is primarily due to the
relatively small number of section 2 cases in the First Circuit.
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cedures of section 5.  In the first five models of Table 5, the estimated
impact of section 5 coverage is small—fewer than five percentage
points—and statistically insignificant.  These estimates contrast with Ellen
Katz’s finding that court decisions in jurisdictions covered by section 5
were significantly more likely to impose liability under section 2 than de-
cisions in other jurisdictions.130  Our analysis reveals that the role of sec-
tion 5 coverage is considerably more complex.
Specifically, we find that only trial judges were more likely to vote in
favor of section 2 liability in covered jurisdictions.  The rates at which
appellate judges favored section 2 liability were unrelated to the presence
of preclearance coverage.  Model (6) in Table 5 shows this by including a
term that interacts the variables for section 5 coverage and appellate re-
view.  The estimates of Model (6) imply that judges at the trial stage were
more likely to favor liability by nearly 25 percentage points in covered
jurisdictions compared to uncovered jurisdictions.  In contrast, for appel-
late judges, this difference is only one percentage point (= .253 − .242),
and it is not statistically significant.  Section 5 coverage thus correlates
with the probability a trial judge favors liability but not with whether an
appellate judge does.
These estimates also imply that in covered jurisdictions, trial judges
were about 26 percentage points (= .242 + .019) more likely to favor lia-
bility than their circuit colleagues.  Outside of covered jurisdictions, the
rates at which trial and appellate judges voted for liability differed by
fewer than two percentage points, a gap that was not statistically distin-
guishable from zero.
These results cast doubt on the conventional view that section 5 cov-
erage increases the probability that a judge votes in favor of liability.  The
conventional view does not acknowledge that the positive correlation be-
tween preclearance coverage and the likelihood of section 2 liability is
limited to trial-stage determinations.  Appellate judges treat challenges in
covered jurisdictions no differently from challenges in other jurisdictions.
This finding highlights the perils of interpreting the frequency of liability
votes as evidence of the underlying rate of violations.  It also indicates
that the relationship between the preclearance coverage and the inci-
dence of section 2 violations is more nuanced than the conventional ac-
count envisions.
130. See Katz, Not Like the South, supra note 28, at 29.  An important difference R
between our analysis here and Katz’s is whether the unit of analysis is a case or a judge’s
vote.  When cases are the unit of analysis, the decisions of trial judges presiding alone
comprise a larger proportion of the dataset, and the patterns characterizing those cases are
prominent in an analysis of judicial decisions.  But, when the votes of judges are the unit of
analysis, the votes of judges presiding alone constitute a smaller proportion of the dataset,
because each case heard by a panel contributes three observations to the dataset while
single-judge trials contribute one observation.  For example, the estimates of Model (6) in
Table 5 contrast with row (D) in Appendix I.
\\server05\productn\C\COL\108-1\COL101.txt unknown Seq: 48  2-JAN-08 15:05
48 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 108:1
3. Practice Types. — Last, the summary statistics in Part I suggested
that liability rates were slightly higher in challenges to local practices than
to state or federal practices, and higher in challenges to at-large election
structures than other practices.  The regressions call into question these
findings as well.  After controlling for other factors, the estimated impact
of a challenge to the practice of a local government, rather than that of a
state or federal government body, is less than two percentage points.
The estimate for whether the challenge was to an at-large election
practice is somewhat sensitive to the different specifications of the time
and place variables.  In the Model (1) regression, the estimate for at-large
challenges is .104 and is statistically insignificant.  When the simple time
and place variables are replaced with the more detailed set, the estimate
falls from .104 to .078.  As described in Part I, this weakening is due to the
fact that the number of at-large challenges declines substantially over this
period.131
E. Summary of Findings
This section provides a nontechnical summary of the basic findings
described above in Parts II.A through II.D.
First, we find that a judge’s partisan affiliation relates closely to the
likelihood that she will vote in favor of liability under section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act.  Democratic appointees are, on average, about 15 per-
centage points more likely than Republican appointees to find a viola-
tion—which makes them nearly 50% more likely to rule for the minority
plaintiffs in these cases.  Moreover, a judge’s partisan affiliation affects
the votes of her colleagues when they review section 2 cases on appellate
panels.  The partisan composition of panels has the largest impact when a
judge sits on a politically homogenous panel.
Second, we find that a judge’s race exerts even more influence than
his partisan affiliation.  African-American judges are, on average, more
than twice as likely as white judges to find that minority citizens’ voting
131. Another variable that appears sensitive to the presence of year and circuit fixed
effects is the indicator for the presence of an African-American plaintiff.  In the regression
in Column (1), which does not does include year and circuit fixed effects, the presence of
an African-American plaintiff implies only a three percentage point increase in the
likelihood of a vote for liability, and the difference is not statistically significant.  That
estimate was consistent with the summary statistics in Appendix I, where the presence of an
African-American plaintiff correlated with a modest increase with liability rates.  With the
addition of year and circuit fixed effects in Column (2), the estimated impact jumps to 11
percentage points.  This jump is due to the high rate at which section 2 cases involved
African-American plaintiffs and to the correlation of that involvement with certain circuits
and years.  In several circuits, nearly every case involved an African-American plaintiff,
while in one circuit, the Tenth, no case had an African-American plaintiff.  Similarly, in
several early years of the data, every case involved an African-American plaintiff.  These
patterns make the estimated effect of an African-American plaintiff sensitive to
conditioning on circuit and year.  Caution is warranted in interpreting this estimate
because the variable correlates so closely with circuits and years.
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rights were violated under section 2.  African-American judges vote in
favor of liability more than half the time, while judges who are not
African-American do so only about one-quarter of the time.  Moreover, a
judge’s race substantially affects the votes of his colleagues on a panel.
Both Republican and Democratic appointees are substantially more likely
to vote in favor of liability when they sit with an African-American judge
than when they do not.
Third, we find that the race and partisanship of judges correlate
much more strongly with liability under the Act than many of the charac-
teristics of the cases that the voting rights literature has suggested should
be important determinants of liability.  These two aspects of judicial iden-
tity—partisanship and race—appear to be considerably more important
than whether a case involves a jurisdiction subject to the section 5
preclearance provisions of the Voting Rights Act, or occurs in the South,
or challenges an at-large electoral system.
III. IMPLICATIONS
Our combined findings concerning race, partisanship, and the con-
ventional account together provide a much more comprehensive view of
Voting Rights Act litigation than has previously been available.  Moreover,
they have potentially important implications for a variety of debates relat-
ing to the protection of minority voting rights and the role of diversity on
the federal judiciary.  We briefly introduce three ongoing debates for
which our findings are important.
A. The Institutional Structure of Voting Rights Enforcement
Which institutional structures are best situated to protect minority
voting rights?  This question was central to the development of the Voting
Rights Act and is crucial to many debates about the Act today.  In 1965,
Congress designed the Act to make use of two different institutions:  fed-
eral courts for nationwide enforcement, and the Justice Department for
the particularly troublesome areas of the country subjected to the
preclearance requirements.132  In August 2006, Congress reauthorized
those preclearance provisions.133  But today there is considerably more
ambivalence about the appropriateness of Department of Justice over-
sight—driven in part by the possibility that the Department will grant or
deny preclearance on the basis of politics.134
Our findings complicate this debate by demonstrating that partisan-
ship is not only an issue within the Justice Department; it also appears to
play a substantial role in the way that federal courts decide voting rights
cases.  As a matter of institutional design, therefore, it is important not to
132. See supra text accompanying notes 46–50. R
133. See supra text accompanying note 50. R
134. See, e.g., Issacharoff, Victim of Its Own Success, supra note 8, at 1730–31. R
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compare a realistic (or pessimistic) view of the Justice Department with
an overly optimistic view of federal courts.
That said, of course, each institution channels partisanship in a dif-
ferent fashion.  One important difference, for example, is that the Justice
Department is centralized while the judiciary is disaggregated.  The disag-
gregated nature of the judiciary will result in partisan variation across
cases.  But if the courts are roughly balanced, this variation might largely
cancel out across a run of cases.135  The centralized Justice Department
review embodied in section 5 will not result in the same partisan variation
across disputes that arise at the same time; but it will provide a different
sort of variation—variation over time as presidential administrations
change.  Of course, this distinction between disaggregation and centrali-
zation captures only one of many ways in which these different institu-
tional structures shape the role that partisanship plays in voting rights
enforcement.  Our point here is just to emphasize the importance of our
results for this ongoing debate about institutional design.
B. Partisan Convergence and the Politics of Voting Rights Act Litigation
As we noted above, voting rights scholars disagree strongly about the
partisan consequences of some modern voting rights litigation.136  This
disagreement focuses centrally on the consequences of case law that
pushes states to create majority-minority districts within their (largely sin-
gle-member) redistricting schemes.  Our data put this debate in perspec-
tive by highlighting the fact that those fights over the creation of majority-
minority districts likely constitute a considerably smaller percentage of
litigation under the Act than the prominence of the debate might
suggest.137
Moreover, the debate over the changing partisan consequences of
such litigation might lead us to expect that, over time, Democratic and
Republican appointees would become less polarized when they decide
section 2 cases.138  Unfortunately, the regression analysis in this Article
can neither confirm nor reject whether this has occurred.  The partisan
135. Still, it is far from clear that it is appropriate to make such tradeoffs across cases,
particularly given that the lawsuits in our data generally concern entirely unconnected
governmental institutions.  For a general discussion of when such tradeoffs may be
appropriate, see Adam B. Cox, Partisan Gerrymandering and Disaggregated Redistricting,
2004 Sup. Ct. Rev. 409.
136. See supra notes 75–76 and accompanying text. R
137. See supra text accompanying note 59 (noting that challenges to at-large election R
practices continued to constitute a majority of section 2 litigation until just a few years
ago); infra Appendix I (showing that challenges to at-large election practices dominate
section 2 litigation).  One important caveat is that our data focus only on section 2
litigation.  Debates about the partisan consequences of the Voting Rights Act have also
concerned the effects of section 5 enforcement, and we cannot identify the patterns of
section 5 disputes.  It is possible that very different patterns are present in section 5
preclearance disputes.
138. See supra notes 77–82 and accompanying text. R
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gap between the rates at which Democratic and Republican appointees
vote for liability has declined over time, but our tests cannot confirm that
this decline is statistically significant.
This suggests a few different possibilities.  On the one hand, the lack
of a statistically significant finding might be taken to be evidence against
those who believe that the partisan valence of the Act has changed con-
siderably.  To the extent judges are carefully attuned to the partisan con-
sequences of section 2 litigation and have reasonably good information
about those consequences in particular cases, we might expect stronger
results if the partisan consequences actually have changed substantially
over time.  But even if section 2 litigation actually has become less benefi-
cial for the Democratic Party, there are reasons why this change might
not translate into statistically significant changes in the relative behavior
of Democratic and Republican appointees.  Perhaps federal judges are
relatively unskilled at assessing the partisan consequences of section 2 lia-
bility in many cases.  If so, they might not react strongly to changes in the
actual partisan consequences.  Or perhaps judges are motivated by some-
thing other than just partisanship or party loyalty.  For example,
Democratic appointees might simply be more committed to the descrip-
tive representation of minority voters than to their party.  If so, they
might conclude that voting for liability still advances that goal even if it
does not advance the interests of the Democratic Party.139  Our data can-
not distinguish between these possible implications.  But they raise addi-
tional questions about the debate over the Act’s partisan consequences
and provide a path for further research.
C. Judicial Diversity
Scholars have long debated the appropriate role of diversity—both
racial and ideological—in the federal judiciary.140  Our findings contrib-
ute to that debate by unearthing the effects of such diversity on the adju-
139. When voting in the electorate is extremely racially polarized and minority voters
favor the Democratic Party, enhancing the ability of minority voters to elect a
representative of their choice (which usually furthers descriptive representation) will
generally also benefit the electoral prospects of Democrats.  When voting is less racially
polarized, however, augmenting the descriptive representation of minority voters is less
likely to benefit the Democratic Party.  See David Epstein & Sharyn O’Halloran, Trends in
Substantive and Descriptive Minority Representation, 1974–2000, in The Future of the
Voting Rights Act 61, 61 (David Epstein et al. eds., 2006); sources cited supra notes 75–76. R
140. In addition to the empirical social science literature concerning racial diversity
that we discussed earlier, there is a substantial nonempirical literature by legal scholars.
See, e.g., Paul Brest, Who Decides?, 58 S. Cal. L. Rev. 661, 664 (1985) (discussing
significance for legal interpretation of fact that “judges, especially federal judges . . . are
overwhelmingly Anglo, male, well educated, and upper or upper middle class”); Sherrilyn
A. Ifill, Racial Diversity on the Bench:  Beyond Role Models and Public Confidence, 57
Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 405 (2000) (arguing that racial diversity in judiciary improves judicial
decisionmaking and promotes legitimacy); Kevin R. Johnson & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, A
Principled Approach to the Quest for Racial Diversity on the Bench, 10 Mich. J. Race & L.
5, 10, 24–33, 45–52 (2004) (arguing that increased racial diversity on the bench “would
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dication of Voting Rights Act cases.  We present perhaps the first findings
in which a judge’s race is closely connected to her decisions and to the
decisions of her colleagues.
Whether our findings support those who argue in favor of greater
racial or ideological diversity on federal courts (particularly federal appel-
late courts) depends in part on how we conceptualize the process of judi-
cial decisionmaking in section 2 cases.  Here there are at least two pos-
sibilities, which we might call the “legal model” and the “policy model.”
First, we might imagine that in many section 2 cases the law actually
provides a “right” answer to the question whether vote dilution exists.  In
such a case, the addition of diversity would be a good thing if it makes the
panel deciding the case more likely to reach that right answer.  The diffi-
culty, of course, is that there is no way to measure directly what would be
the “right” answer as a matter of law.  Still, it might be possible to identify
improvements if one could identify the mechanisms through which race
and partisanship make a difference.  Earlier, for example, we discussed
the possibility that adding diversity brings additional information to the
decisionmaking process.141  Identifying the existence of an information
advantage might be an indirect way of measuring whether the mixed
panels get closer to the right answer than ideologically or racially pure
panels.  Other mechanisms are of course possible.  Imagine that all po-
tentially mixed panels produced roughly the same outcomes in our
data—regardless of whether the panels contained one or two Democratic
appointees—but that the pure Democratic and pure Republican panels
produced highly divergent outcomes.  We might take this as evidence
that the minority member on a mixed panel is disciplining the majority to
follow the law by threatening to be a whistleblower if the majority ignores
the law.142  After all, if outcomes were all about ideology and not at all
about law, then we might think that the panels with two Democratic ap-
pointees would produce more liberal results than the panels with only
one Democratic appointee.  In short, our findings raise the possibility
that diversity improves the accuracy of decisionmaking, while highlight-
ing the need for additional work to understand the mechanisms through
which diversity makes a difference.
Second, we might conclude that section 2 doctrine seldom provides
a “right” answer to the question whether vote dilution exists.  This possi-
bility, quite real in many section 2 cases, makes clear that judges are in
part making policy when they decide these cases.  For example, judges
often must make tough choices about whether the Voting Rights Act
should focus more on electing racial minorities (descriptive representa-
both benefit the decision-making process and improve public perception of the
impartiality of judicial decision-making”).
141. See supra Part II.B.2.
142. For an empirical study supporting this proposition, see Frank B. Cross &
Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine:  Whistleblowing
on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 Yale L.J. 2155 (1998).
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tion) or instead on promoting the interests of racial minorities (substan-
tive representation).143  If section 2 litigation is in part a policymaking
process, then the desirability of diversity does not turn only on the ques-
tion of accuracy; it turns also on the question of who we want involved in
that policymaking process.  Consider debates about racial diversity in leg-
islative assemblies or on juries.  Scholars often argue for such diversity
despite the fact that they do not have any direct way of measuring
whether a racially mixed legislature or jury produces more “optimal” de-
cisions.  Instead, they defend diversity on a variety of process-oriented
grounds.  One standard ground is that it is worse to have legislative deci-
sions made by people who all share the same perspective, and that in-
creasing racial diversity is likely to increase the diversity of perspectives
present during deliberations.144  If we think that courts deciding section
2 cases are in part policymaking institutions, then some of these same
representation-based arguments might apply.
IV. CONCLUSION
Race and partisanship are important in litigation under section 2 of
the Voting Rights Act.  This statement is so obvious as to be banal.  After
all, the very purpose of the provision is to ensure that racial minorities
have an equal opportunity to participate in the election process and to
elect representatives of their choice.  Yet the possibility that a judge’s race
or partisan affiliation might affect her voting patterns in section 2 cases
has gone unstudied.  The absence of inquiry is especially curious because
the period since the 1982 amendments to the Act has been marked by
parallel developments in academia:  a burgeoning legal scholarship on
voting rights and increasingly sophisticated statistical analyses of judicial
decisionmaking.  This Article brings these developments together for the
first time.  It provides the first systematic evidence that a judge’s race and
partisan affiliation are important determinants of liability in section 2
cases.  Race and partisanship affect a judge’s own voting behavior, as well
as the voting behavior of fellow judges sitting on a panel.  These findings
raise important questions about the enforcement of the Voting Rights Act
and the role of diversity in the federal judiciary.  Our hope is that this
Article will help advance those conversations.
143. For a good example of a case in which judges disagree over which goal the Act
should pursue, compare Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 482–85 (2003) (O’Connor, J.)
(concluding that section 5 obligates courts to defer to states’ choices about how to make
trade-offs between descriptive and substantive representation), with id. at 493–95 (Souter,
J., dissenting) (arguing that section 5 focuses principally on promoting descriptive
representation).
144. See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, Race and the Judiciary, 20 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 325,
328 (2002); Ifill, supra note 140, at 409–11. R
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APPENDIX 1. CHARACTERISTICS OF CASES AND RATE OF FINDING
SECTION 2 LIABILITY
Fraction Finding § 2 Liability
Among Cases . . .
Fraction of
Cases with . . . without
this . . . with this this Difference of
Characteristic Characteristic Characteristic (2)–(3):
Characteristic (1) (2) (3) (4)
(A) All Cases 1.000 .302 — —
(.0000) (.025)
[341] [341]
(B) Cases Decided After 1994 .387 .205 .364 −.159**
(.026) (.035) (.033) (.050)
[341] [132] [209]
(C) Cases Occurring in the South .636 .341 .234 .107**
(.026) (.032) (.038) (.052)
[341] [217] [124]
(D) Cases Occurring in Jurisdictions .276 .394 .267 .126**
Covered by § 5 (.024) (.051) (.028) (.055)
[341] [94] [247]
(E) Practices Challenged .540 .337 .261 .076
(E1) At-Large Elections (.027) (.035) (.035) (.050)
[341] [184] [157]
(E2) Reapportionment .346 .297 .305 −.008
(.026) (.042) (.031) (.052)
[341] [118] [223]
(E2) Other Practices .158 .222 .317 −.095
(.020) (.057) (.028) (.068)
[341] [54] [287]
(F) Challenge to Local Election Practice .718 .322 .250 .072
(.024) (.030) (.044) (.055)
[341] [245] [96]
(G) Plaintiff Race or Ethnicity
(G1) African-American .830 .307 .276 .032
(.020) (.027) (.059) (.066)
[341] [283] [58]
(G2) Latino .302 .223 .336 −.113**
(.025) (.041) (.031) (.054)
[341] [103] [238]
(G3) More than One Racial Group .232 .241 .321 −.080
(.025) (.048) (.029) (.059)
[341] [79] [262]
(H) Type of Court Hearing the Case
(H1) Single Trial Judge .504 .349 .254 .094*
(.027) (.036) (.034) (.050)
[341] [172] [169]
(H2) Trial Panel .106 .306 .302 .004
(.017) (.078) (.026) (.081)
[341] [36] [305]
(H3) Appellate Panel .390 .241 .341 −.101**
(.026) (.037) (.033) (.051)
[341] [133] [208]
Notes: Table provides means, standard errors in parentheses, and number of observations in brackets. * means
significant at 10% level. ** means significant at 5% level.
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